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Cursory Sketch of the Campaigns of General Bragg.

By Major E. T. SYKES.

THE ARMY AT DALTON.

The "Army of Tennessee" fell back and went into winter quarters at Dalton, Georgia, forty miles distant from Chattanooga, and where the Georgia State road connects with the East Tennessee railroad.* Soon after, General Bragg, appreciating his relations to

*Extract from a letter of General Bragg to the writer, dated February 8th, 1873:

"In our retreat from Missionary Ridge, the enemy could make but a feeble pursuit, for want of artillery horses (*Grant's report*). At the mountain gorge near Ringgold, I believed he could be successfully repulsed, and the army quickly withdrawn. General Cleburn, one of the best and truest soldiers in our cause, was placed at that point in command of the rear guard. Late at night, hours after all the army was at rest, my information being all in, I called for a reliable confidential staff officer, and gave him verbal directions to ride immediately to Cleburn, about three (3) miles in my rear, at this mountain gorge, and give him my positive orders to hold his position up to a named hour the next day, and if attacked, to defend the

the service, and feeling that a portion of his troops were dissatisfied with and disposed to criticise his military operations, to allay all apprehensions, patriotically requested the President to relieve him from the command of that army whose fortunes he had followed and whose fate he had shared through the trying vicissitudes of more than two years of active operations. His request was granted and Lieutenant-General Hardee temporarily placed in command, in a short time to be replaced by General Joseph E. Johnston. But the President, knowing General Bragg's abilities and appreciating them, was not disposed so summarily to dispense with his services, and hence immediately called him to Richmond in the capacity of military adviser. Thus ended the connection of General Bragg with the Army of the West, or, as then more properly termed, the "Army of Northern Georgia."

GENERAL BRAGG RELIEVED OF COMMAND AND SUBSEQUENT VISIT TO
THE ARMY.

He never, subsequent to that time, made but one visit to his old and to him cherished command, and then to find it sadly changed—a visit pregnant with the issues of its life or death and involving the very existence of the Confederacy. It was at or about the time of the removal of General Johnston from, and the substitution of the "bravest

pass at every hazard. The message was delivered at Cleburn's camp fire. He heard it with surprise and expressed his apprehension that it would result in the loss of his command, as his information differed from mine, and he believed the enemy would turn his position and cut him off. 'But,' said he, true soldier as he was, 'I always obey orders, and only ask as a protection, in case of disaster, that you put the order in writing.' This was done as soon as materials could be found, and the staff officer returned and reported the result of his mission. He had not reached me, however, before the attack, *in front*, as I expected, was made. Cleburn gallantly met it, defeated the enemy under Hooker, drove him back, and then quietly followed the army without further molestation. Mark the difference in conduct and results. A good soldier, by obedience, without substituting his own crude notions, defeats the enemy and saves an army from disaster. And mark the credit he gets for it. The Confederate Congress passed a vote of thanks to the gallant Cleburn and his command for saving Bragg's army. Not to this day has it ever been known that he did it in obedience to orders and against his judgment, which does not detract from, but adds to his fame. *Captain Samuel A. Harris*, Assistant Adjutant-General, of Montgomery, Alabama, was the officer who delivered the order. He is now an Episcopal clergyman, with the largest congregation in New Orleans, and has recently repeated the whole matter to me as distinctly as if it had occurred yesterday."

of the brave," the gallant J. B. Hood, to the command of the army with the rank of General.

GENERAL HOOD COMMANDING ARMY OF NORTHERN GEORGIA.

Hood was offered a sacrifice on the shrine of his country, and be it said to his glory and honor that, knowing it, he, for his country's good, unhesitatingly accepted its consequences. On his assumption of the command of the army, if I recollect correctly, it did not aggregate, including every arm of the service, but little in excess of twenty-five thousand effective men, and yet with that number he was willing, from a sense of patriotic duty, to compromise his bright and brilliant military record with the masses, who were ignorant of the situation, the most if not all of whom were his admirers, and to the ability of his little army, to give battle to the overwhelming odds under Sherman, for the one last lingering hope of holding Atlanta, the key to the Confederacy.

And, though failing in the end, gallantly did he redeem his responsible pledge. The venture was hazardous in the extreme, and it required brave officers to meet the emergency. 'Twas then that the brave and chivalric Stephen D. Lee, who merited the high compliments of President Davis, paid him before the Legislature of Mississippi the year previous, was called to the command of Hood's corps, and our equally gallant and intrepid Jacob H. Sharp and others, tried and true men, were promoted to the rank of general officers, in which capacity their military skill was more urgently needed and their valuable services could at the same time be rewarded. The battles of the 22d and 28th of July, 1864, around Atlanta, and at Jonesboro' on the 31st August following, attested the wisdom of these appointments. And although we were not successful in the immediate results of the battlefield, we showed to the haughty enemy that all chivalry was not buried in the grave of Charlemagne, but some, at least, remained to adorn the brow and make resplendent the character of the Southern officer and soldier. That character to-day of the Southerner which makes him respected abroad and by his enemies, and the latter is by every hellish device endeavoring to destroy and render ignoble, is as surely the result of her sons' bravery upon the field of battle as that the needle points unerringly to the pole. They may endeavor to crush out the last spark of patriotism in the breasts of her fellow-braves, but never, as long as she has sons and daughters worthy of their proud lineage, can our enemies succeed, but from each fell blow we

and our children will rebound, Phoenix-like, to assert our equality. Her children, whether at home or wandering abroad, will remember with fondness the land of their nativity, and, remembering, cherish the cenotaphs erected to commemorate the deathless valor of the Confederate soldier, be he officer or be he private, who fell battling for her rights, and revere the tottering steps of the old man who in years to come will tell in nursery tales to his anxiously listening offspring of the hardships he endured and the dangers he braved in behalf of his country's honor. And none more than the one of whom I am immediately speaking can truthfully and proudly relate them of himself.

The writer will never forget the remark made by Hood the night after he crossed the Chattahoochie and had established headquarters with General W. H. Jackson, commanding the cavalry of his army, and on whose staff the writer at that time was A. A. General. It was a dark and rainy night, and when the courier came up and reported that the last of the army had crossed and the pontoons had been taken up, Hood remarked to the circle of officers present: "I once more feel glorious; I am north of the Chattahoochie." Then we lay down for the night, to resume on the next morning in good earnest the march into Tennessee which terminated so disastrously at Nashville.

CONCLUSION.

In conclusion of this sketch, which is written purely from recollection, and partly from memoranda made at the time, I deem it not amiss to say in justification of General Bragg's discipline that it was simply the misfortune of the Confederacy that she had so few officers like him to carry out and enforce her laws, and thereby render her arms what they should have been, efficient and perfect.

Captious critics, the most of whom were in the rear, could not appreciate the vital importance of discipline in an army, nor did they stop to reflect that the very laws the operations of which they so much condemned were enacted by their Congressmen chosen by their suffrages, and some of whom, strange to say, united in the clamor. Like the President, Bragg was, in one sense of the term, an executive officer, and the law of Congress making it a death penalty to run cotton through the lines had by him, as a good and true officer, to be rigidly enforced, regardless of its propriety in the abstract.

When caught in the act the accused was given the benefit of a trial before a court-martial, and if found guilty, and the proceedings in

other respects being regular, he invariably received the punishment awarded.

The pithy maxim of Talleyrand, "nothing succeeds like success," is a vulgar and oftentimes an erroneous criterion.

Concede the applicability of such a test to the relative valor, generalship and military character of the Northern and Southern armies, during the war, and we "exalt the soldiers of the North above all precedent and consign the unequalled valor of the Southern soldiery to reproach, instead of the deathless fame which shall survive them. To such a judgment every battle-field of the war gives emphatic and indignant contradiction."

Time, the great arbiter of us all, is as sure to give Bragg rank among the first Generals of the late war and triumphantly vindicate his discipline, as that it will dissipate the twilight haze which yet "obscures the grand effort of patriotism" of which he was a prominent helmsman. With a devotion which shrank from no sacrifice and quailed before no peril, he buckled around him the armor of the right and wielding the shield of Achilles, which the inferior Greek was unable to lift, despite overwhelming numbers of the enemy, furnished by his example the strongest evidence of his belief in the correctness and justice of the cause he espoused.

Letters from Fort Sumter in 1862 and 1863.

By LIEUTENANT IREDELL JONES, *First Regiment South Carolina Regulars.*

[We have on hand a number of letters written by Lieutenant Jones, while serving in Fort Sumter, to his parents. As vivid descriptions, written at the time, of the events they describe by a gallant participant in the heroic defence of Sumter, they are of interest and historic value worthy of a place in our records.]

LETTER NO. 1.

FORT SUMTER, June 18th, 1862.

You have heard by the papers the particulars of the bloody fight of the 16th, at Secessionville. Though on a small scale, this war furnishes not one instance of a more gallant charge on the part of the enemy, and of a more desperate and determined resistance on the part of our own men. The battery was contested on the ramparts in a hand to hand fight, and a log was rolled from the top to

sweep the enemy from the sides of the breastwork. All praise is due to the Charleston battalion and Lamar's two companies of artillery, as well as Smith's battalion, and had it not been for the desperate fighting of these commands, while reinforcements were being sent for, the important point at Secessionville would have been lost. But while we give all credit to our own troops, let us never again disparage our enemy and call them cowards, for nothing was ever more glorious than their three charges in the face of a raking fire of grape and canister, and then at last, as if to do or die, they broke into two columns and rushed against our right and left flanks, which movement would have gained the day, had not our reinforcements arrived. We were emphatically surprised, but it could not have been otherwise expected, when we recollect that the three commands before mentioned, which were at Secessionville, had been under fire of the enemy's battery for the past two weeks, being shelled day and night, and thereby almost exhausted from want of sleep. The lamented Captain Reed had been manning our battery for, ten days with his company. Many of our finest men were killed, and all the friends or relations of some of the officers in the Fort, and a general gloom is spread over the countenances of all here now.

And now I will try and tell you something about our situation on James Island, as I have had the chance of learning, having in company with some other officers in the Fort visited the Island, on Sunday last, the day before the battle, and having seen all our outposts, breastworks, batteries, &c., as well as a large portion of the troops. A dense woods separates our army from the enemy, and all along for from 3,000 to 4,000 yards in rear of these woods, *i. e.*, towards our side, is a level, open space, and in most places can only be passed over by the army, on account of marsh-lands, by roads. Now, cutting across the island to the rear of this level space, stretch our breastworks, in which we have a few guns mounted at considerable intervals apart, and behind which infantry and field-batteries will be protected. You see at once the strength of our position. The roads will be thoroughly guarded, and if a column advances across one of these fields, it will be exposed to the fire of artillery as soon as it makes its appearance. It can then be raked when nearer by grape and canister, and as soon as it comes within range nothing protects it from the volleys of our infantry. Secessionville is a very important point on the creek that divides Morris's from James's Island and constitutes our extreme left flank, and if taken the enemy could turn our left. It was for this reason, no doubt, that the attack

was made the other day, and for this reason also that our Generals are so determined to hold it. The enemy's gun-boats can come up within shelling distance of it, and to hold their place our troops were obliged to remain there under fire. We have about 8,000, or perhaps as many as 10,000, men on the island, and all, I believe in good condition. The enemy's force is estimated at 9,000, under General Stephens. If this is the true estimate it certainly would seem as if we could hold them in check for any length of time. Fort Sumter is about three miles distant from Secessionville, but it seems to me impossible for the enemy's gunboats ever to come from that quarter to attack us, as the stream is only navigable to very small boats, and that, too, only at very high tides. Their object is to take James's Island and plant mortar batteries.

While on the island we visited our outposts, and I had the pleasure of seeing, from the top of a tree, the Yankee pickets, about six hundred yards distant. It seems strange, but is true, that the pickets of the two armies sit down at this distance apart and look at each other all day. After amusing ourselves looking at Yankees, we went to the breastworks and camps, after which we returned to Colonel Lamar's headquarters, expecting to return to the fort, but on learning that our battery was to commence replying to the enemy's battery, which, together with the gun-boats, had been shelling Secessionville and our battery all the morning, we concluded to walk down and see the duel. We stopped at Secessionville a few moments, and then, led on by curiosity, rather than by wisdom, we went across an open field under fire, to our battery, eight hundred yards distant, and remained there an hour, looking at the mortar practice. The enemy fired very rapidly and with great precision, striking the battery or grazing the top nearly every time. Their shells bursted mostly in rear of us, and only once directly overhead, which wounded two men. There were five of us along together, composing our party. It was very unwise of us to have exposed ourselves thus recklessly, and the more so that we should have done so merely out of curiosity.

Your affectionate son,

IREDELL JONES.

Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, August 31, 1864. (a)

Compiled by War Records Office, Washington.

[Corrections earnestly solicited, if errors are found.]

FIRST ARMY CORPS.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL R. H. ANDERSON Commanding.

PICKETT'S DIVISION.

Major-General George E. Pickett.

Barton's Brigade.

Brigadier-General Seth M. Barton. (b)

Ninth Virginia, Colonel J. J. Phillips.

Fourteenth Virginia, Colonel William White.

Thirty-eighth Virginia, Colonel George K. Griggs.

Fifty-third Virginia, Colonel W. R. Aylett.

Fifty-seventh Virginia, Colonel C. R. Fontaine.

Hunton's Brigade.

Brigadier-General Eppa Hunton.

Eighth Virginia, Colonel N. Berkeley.

Eighteenth Virginia, Colonel H. A. Carrington.

Nineteenth Virginia, Colonel Henry Gantt.

Twenty-eighth Virginia, Colonel William Watts.

Fifty-sixth Virginia, Colonel P. P. Slaughter.

Corse's Brigade.

Brigadier-General M. D. Corse.

Fifteenth Virginia, Colonel T. P. August.

Seventeenth Virginia, Colonel Arthur Herbert.

Twenty-ninth Virginia, Colonel James Giles.

Thirtieth Virginia, Colonel A. T. Harrison.

Thirty-second Virginia, Colonel E. B. Montague.

Terry's Brigade.

Brigadier-General William R. Terry.

First Virginia, Colonel F. G. Skinner.

(a) From monthly return when not otherwise indicated. The original return does not always indicate actual commanders.

(b) Colonel W. R. Aylett was in command August 29th, and probably at above date.

Third Virginia, Colonel Joseph Mayo, Jr.
Seventh Virginia, Colonel C. C. Flowerree.
Eleventh Virginia, Colonel M. S. Langhorne.
Twenty-fourth Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Maury.

FIELD'S DIVISION. (c)

Major-General C. W. Field.

Anderson's Brigade.

Brigadier-General G. T. Anderson.

Seventh Georgia, Colonel G. H. Carmical.
Eighth Georgia, Colonel J. R. Towers
Ninth Georgia, Lieutenant-Colonel E. F. Hoge.
Eleventh Georgia, Colonel F. H. Little.
Fifty-ninth Georgia, Colonel Jack Brown.

Law's Brigade.

Colonel P. D. Bowles.

Fourth Alabama, Colonel P. D. Bowles.
Fifteenth Alabama, Colonel A. A. Lowther.
Forty-fourth Alabama, Colonel W. F. Perry.
Forty-seventh Alabama, Colonel M. J. Bulger.
Forty-eighth Alabama, Lieutenant-Colonel W. M. Hardwick.

Bratton's Brigade.

Brigadier-General John Bratton.

First South Carolina, Colonel J. R. Hagood.
Second South Carolina [Rifles], Colonel R. E. Bowen.
Fifth South Carolina, Colonel A. Coward.
Sixth South Carolina, Colonel J. M. Steedman.
Palmetto Sharpshooters, Colonel Joseph Walker.

KERSHAW'S DIVISION. (d)

Major-General J. B. Kershaw.

Wofford's Brigade.

Sixteenth Georgia, Major James S. Gholston.
Eighteenth Georgia, Colonel Joseph Armstrong.
Twenty-fourth Georgia, Colonel C. C. Sanders.

(c) Inspection report of this division for August 30, 1864, shows that it also contained Benning's and Gregg's brigades. The return shows but two Brigadier-Generals present for duty; names not indicated.

(d) Only two Brigadier-Generals reported present for duty; names not indicated.

Third Georgia Battalion (sharp-shooters), Lieutenant-Colonel
N. L. Hutchins.

Phillips's Legion, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Hamilton.

Cobb's Legion, Lieutenant-Colonel L. J. Glenn.

Bryan's Brigade.

Tenth Georgia, Colonel W. C. Holt.

Fiftieth Georgia, Colonel P. McGlashan.

Fifty-first Georgia, Colonel E. Ball.

Fifty-third Georgia, Colonel James P. Simms.

Humphrey's Brigade.

Thirteenth Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. O'Brien.

Seventeenth Mississippi, Captain J. C. Cochran.

Eighteenth Mississippi, Colonel T. M. Griffin.

Twenty-first Mississippi, Colonel D. N. Moody.

Kershaw's [old] Brigade.

Second South Carolina, Colonel J. D. Kennedy.

Third South Carolina, Colonel W. D. Rutherford.

Seventh South Carolina, Captain E. J. Goggans.

Eighth South Carolina, Colonel J. W. Henagan.

Fifteenth South Carolina, Colonel J. B. Davis.

Twentieth South Carolina, Colonel S. M. Boykin.

Third South Carolina Battalion, Lieutenant-[Colonel] W. G.
Rice.

SECOND ARMY CORPS. (a)

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY Commanding.

GORDON'S DIVISION.

Major-General John B. Gordon.

Hays's Brigade. (b)

Fifth Louisiana, Colonel Henry Forno.

Sixth Louisiana, Colonel William Monaghan.

Seventh Louisiana, Colonel D. B. Penn.

Eighth Louisiana, Colonel A. DeBlanc.

Ninth Louisiana, Colonel William R. Peck.

(a) See organization of the Army of the Valley District August 20th and 31st, as shown by inspection reports. Notes (b) to (i) refer to that organization.

(b) Constituting York's brigade.

Gordon's Brigade. (c)

Thirteenth Georgia, Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Baker.
Twenty-sixth Georgia, Colonel E. N. Atkinson.
Thirty-first Georgia, Colonel C. A. Evans.
Thirty-eighth Georgia, Colonel J. D. Mathews.
Sixtieth Georgia, Colonel W. H. Stiles.
Sixty-first Georgia, Colonel J. H. Lamar.

Pegram's Brigade. (d)

Brigadier-General John Pegram.

Thirteenth Virginia, Colonel J. E. B. Terrill.
Thirty-first Virginia, Colonel J. S. Hoffman.
Forty-ninth Virginia, Colonel J. C. Gibson.
Fifty-second Virginia, Colonel James H. Skinner.
Fifty-eighth Virginia, Colonel F. H. Board.

Hoke's Brigade. (e)

Sixth North Carolina, Colonel R. F. Webb.
Twenty-first North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel W. S. Rankin.
Fifty-fourth North Carolina, Colonel K. M. Murchison.
Fifty-seventh North Carolina, Colonel A. C. Godwin.
First North Carolina Battalion, Major [R. W.] Wharton.

JOHNSON'S DIVISION.

Stonewall Brigade. (f)

Second Virginia, Colonel J. Q. A. Nadenbousch.
Fourth Virginia, Colonel William Terry.
Fifth Virginia, Colonel J. H. S. Funk.
Twenty-seventh Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles [L.] Haynes.
Thirty-third Virginia, Colonel F. W. M. Holliday.

Steuart's Brigade. (f)

Tenth Virginia, Colonel E. T. H. Warren.
Twenty-third Virginia, Colonel A. G. Taliaferro.
Thirty-seventh Virginia, Colonel T. V. Williams.

(c) Evans's brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding, and containing Twelfth Georgia Battalion.

(d) In Ramseur's division.

(e) Godwin's brigade, Ramseur's division.

(f) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry's brigade, Gordon's division.

First North Carolina, Colonel H. A. Brown.
Third North Carolina, Colonel S. D. Thruston.

Jones's Brigade. (f)

Twenty-first Virginia, Colonel W. A. Witcher.
Twenty-fifth Virginia, Colonel J. C. Higginbotham.
Forty-second Virginia, Colonel R. W. Withers.
Forty-fourth Virginia, Colonel Norvell Cobb.
Forty-eighth Virginia, Colonel R. A. Dungan.
Fiftieth Virginia, Colonel A. S. Vanderverter.

Stafford's Brigade. (b)

First Louisiana, Colonel W. R. Shivers.
Second Louisiana, Colonel J. M. Williams.
Tenth Louisiana, Colonel E. Waggaman.
Fourteenth Louisiana, Colonel Z. York.
Fifteenth Louisiana, Colonel E. Pendleton.

RODES'S DIVISION.

Major-General R. E. Rodes.

Daniel's Brigade. (g)

Thirty-second North Carolina, Colonel E. C. Brabble.
Forty-third North Carolina, Colonel Thomas S. Kenan.
Forty-fifth North Carolina, Colonel Samuel H. Boyd.
Fifty-third North Carolina, Colonel Wm. A. Owens.
Second North Carolina Battalion, Major John M. Hancock.

Ramseur's Brigade. (h)

Second North Carolina, Colonel W. R. Cox.
Fourth North Carolina, Colonel Bryan Grimes.
Fourteenth North Carolina, Colonel R. T. Bennett.
Thirtieth North Carolina, Colonel F. M. Parker.

Doles's Brigade. (i)

Fourth Georgia, Colonel Philip Cook.
Twelfth Georgia, Colonel Edward Willis.
Twenty-first Georgia, Colonel John T. Mercer.
Forty-fourth Georgia, Colonel W. H. Peebles.

(f) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry's brigade, Gordon's division.

(b) Constituting York's brigade.

(g) Grimes's brigade.

(h) With North Carolina regiments from Steuart's brigade was Cox's brigade.

(i) Cook's brigade.

Battle's Brigade.

Brigadier-General C. A. Battle.

Third Alabama, Colonel Charles Forsyth.

Fifth Alabama, Colonel J. M. Hall.

Sixth Alabama, Colonel J. N. Lightfoot.

Twelfth Alabama, Colonel S. B. Pickens.

Sixty-first Alabama, Major [Lieutenant-Colonel] L. H. Hill.

Johnston's Brigade. (d)

Fifth North Carolina, Colonel T. M. Garrett.

Twelfth North Carolina, Colonel H. E. Coleman.

Twentieth North Carolina, Colonel T. F. Toon.

Twenty-third North Carolina, Major C. C. Blacknall.

THIRD ARMY CORPS.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL A. P. HILL Commanding.

MAHONE'S DIVISION. (a)

Sanders's Brigade.

Eighth Alabama, Colonel Y. L. Royston.

Ninth Alabama, Colonel J. H. King.

Tenth Alabama, Colonel W. H. Forney.

Eleventh Alabama, Lieutenant-Colonel G. E. Tayloe.

Fourteenth Alabama, Colonel L. Pinckard.

Harris's Brigade. (b)

Colonel Joseph M. Jayne.

Twelfth Mississippi, Captain S. Botters.

Sixteenth Mississippi, Captain John S. Lewis.

Nineteenth Mississippi, Colonel R. W. Phipps.

Forty-eighth Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas B. Manlove.

Mahone's Brigade.

Sixth Virginia, Colonel G. T. Rogers.

Twelfth Virginia, Colonel D. A. Weisiger.

Sixteenth Virginia, Colonel Joseph H. Ham.

(d) In Ramseur's division.

(a) Return reports but one General officer present for duty; name not indicated.

(b) Actual commanders given as shown by inspection reports.

Forty-first Virginia, Colonel W. A. Parham.

Sixty-first Virginia, Colonel V. D. Groner.

Wright's Brigade.

Second Georgia Battalion, Major C. J. Moffett.

Tenth Georgia Battalion, Captain J. D. Frederick.

Third Georgia, Colonel E. J. Walker.

Twenty-second Georgia, Colonel G. H. Jones.

Forty-eighth Georgia, Colonel William Gibson.

Sixty-fourth Georgia, Major W. H. Weems.

Finegan's Brigade.

Second Florida, Major W. [R.] Moore.

Fifth Florida, Colonel T. B. Lamar.

Eighth Florida, Colonel D. Lang.

Ninth Florida, Colonel J. M. Martin.

Tenth Florida, Colonel C. [F.] Hopkins.

Eleventh Florida, Colonel T. W. Brevard.

WILCOX'S DIVISION.

Major-General C. M. Wilcox.

Thomas's Brigade. (b)

Colonel Thomas J. Simmons.

Fourteenth Georgia, Major W. L. Goldsmith.

Thirty-fifth Georgia, Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. McCullohs.

Forty-fifth Georgia, Captain A. W. Gibson.

Forty-ninth Georgia, Colonel John T. Jordan.

McGowan's Brigade. (b)

Brigadier-General Samuel McGowan.

First South Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel A. P. Butler.

Twelfth South Carolina, Captain R. M. Kerr.

Thirteenth South Carolina, Captain D. R. Duncan.

Fourteenth South Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Croft.

Orr's Rifles, Major J. T. Robertson.

Lane's Brigade. (b)

Brigadier-General James H. Lane.

Seventh North Carolina, Captain J. G. Harris.

Eighteenth North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel J. W. McGill.

Twenty-eighth North Carolina, Major S. N. Stowe.

(b) Actual commanders given as shown by inspection reports.

Thirty-third North Carolina, Captain W. J. Callais.
Thirty-seventh North Carolina, Colonel W. M. Barbour.

Scales's Brigade.

Brigadier-General Alfred M. Scales.

Thirteenth North Carolina, Colonel J. H. Hyman.
Sixteenth North Carolina, Colonel W. A. Stowe.
Twenty-second North Carolina, T. S. Gallaway.
Thirty-fourth North Carolina, Colonel W. L. J. Lowrance.
Thirty-eighth, North Carolina, Colonel John Ashford.

HETH'S DIVISION. (c)

Major-General H. Heth.

Davis's Brigade.

Second Mississippi, Colonel J. M. Stone.
Eleventh Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel W. B. Lowry.
Twenty-sixth Mississippi, Colonel A. E. Reynolds.
Forty-second Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel A. M. Nelson.
First Confederate Battalion, ———.

Cook's Brigade.

Fifteenth North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Yarbrough.
Twenty-seventh North Carolina, Colonel J. A. Gilmer, Jr.
Forty-sixth North Carolina, Colonel W. L. Saunders.
Forty-eighth North Carolina, Colonel S. H. Walkup.

McRae's Brigade.

Eleventh North Carolina, Colonel W. J. Martin.
Twenty sixth North Carolina, Colonel J. R. Lane.
Forty-fourth North Carolina, Colonel T. C. Singeltary.
Forty-seventh North Carolina, Colonel G. H. Faribault.
Fifty-second North Carolina, Colonel M. A. Parks.

Archer's Brigade.

First Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel N. J. George.
Seventh Tennessee, Colonel J. A. Fite.
Fourteenth Tennessee, Colonel W. McComb.
Thirteenth Alabama, Lieutenant-Colonel James Aiken.

(c) Four Brigadier-Generals reported present for duty; names not indicated.

Walker's Brigade.

Twenty-second Virginia Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel E. P. Tayloe.
 Fortieth Virginia, Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Cunningham.
 Forty-seventh Virginia, Colonel R. M. Mayo.
 Fifty-fifth Virginia, Colonel W. S. Christian.
 Second Maryland Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel James R. Herbert.

Unattached.

Fifth Alabama Battalion.

CAVALRY CORPS. (a)

MAJOR-GENERAL WADE HAMPTON, Commanding.

LEE'S DIVISION. (b)

Major-General Fitzhugh Lee.

Wickham's Brigade.

Brigadier-General W. C. Wickham.

First Virginia, Colonel R. W. Carter.
 Second Virginia, Colonel T. T. Munford,
 Third Virginia, Colonel T. H. Owen.
 Fourth Virginia, Colonel W. H. Payne.

Lomax's Brigade.

Brigadier General L. L. Lomax

Fifth Virginia, Colonel H. Clay Pate.
 Sixth Virginia, Colonel Julian Harrison.
 Fifteenth Virginia, Colonel C. R. Collins.

BUTLER'S DIVISION.

Major-General M. C. Butler.

Dunovant's Brigade.

Brigadier-General John Dunovant.

Third South Carolina, [Colonel C. J. Colcock.]
 Fourth South Carolina, [Colonel B. H. Rutledge.]
 Fifth [Sixth] South Carolina, Colonel [H. K.] Aiken.

(a) On face of return appears to have consisted of Hampton's, Fitz. Lee's and W. H. F. Lee's divisions and Dearing's brigade.

(b) Reported as detached.

Young's Brigade.

Brigadier-General P. M. B. Young.

Cobb's Georgia Legion, Colonel G. J. Wright,
Phillips' Legion, Lieutenant-Colonel W. W. Rich.
Jeff. Davis Legion, Lieutenant-Colonel J. F. Waring.
Miller's Legion, — — —.
Love's Legion, — — —.
Seventh Georgia, Major [E. C.] Anderson.

Rosser's Brigade.

Brigadier-General Thomas L. Rosser.

Seventh Virginia, Colonel R. H. Dulany.
Eleventh Virginia, Colonel O. R. Funsten.
Twelfth Virginia, Colonel A. W. Harman.
Thirty-fifth Virginia Battalion, Lieut.-Colonel E. V. White.

LEE'S DIVISION.

Major-General W. H. F. Lee.

Barringer's Brigade.

Brigadier-General Rufus Barringer.

First North Carolina, Colonel W. H. Cheek.
Second N. C., Col. C. M. Andrews (c) [Col. W. P. Roberts].
Fourth North Carolina, Colonel D. D. Ferebee.
Fifth North Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel S. B. Evans.

Chambliss's Brigade.

Brigadier-General J. R. Chambliss, Jr.

Ninth Virginia, Colonel R. L. T. Beale.
Tenth Virginia, Colonel J. Lucius Davis.
Thirteenth Virginia, Colonel J. C. Phillips.

ARTILLERY.(a)

BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. N. PENDLETON Commanding.

FIRST CORPS ARTILLERY.

Brigadier-General E. P. Alexander.(a)

Cabell's Battalion.

Colonel H. C. Cabell.

Manly's Battery, Captain B. C. Manly.

(c) On the original of this ; was killed June 23, 1864.

(a) But one General officer reported for duty in the artillery, and Alexander's name not on original.

First Company Richmond Howitzers, Capt. R. M. Anderson.
Carlton's Battery, Captain H. H. Carlton.
Callaway's Battery, First Lieutenant M. Callaway.

Haskell's Battalion.

Major J. C. Haskell.

Branch's Battery, Captain [H. G.] Flanner.
Nelson's Battery, Lieutenant [W. B.] Stanfield.
Garden's Battery, Captain [H. R.] Garden.
Rowan Battery, Lieutenant [Ezekiel] Myers.

Huger's Battalion.

Major F. Huger.

Smith's Battery, Captain [John D.] Smith.
Moody's Battery, Lieutenant [G.] Poindexter.
Woolfolk's Battery, Lieutenant [James] Woolfolk.
Parker's Battery, Captain [W. W.] Parker.
Taylor's Battery, Captain [O. B.] Taylor.
Fickling's Battery, Captain [W. W.] Fickling.
Martin's Battery, Captain — Martin.

Gibbes's Battalion.

[Major Wade H.] Gibbes.

Davidson's Battery, Lieutenant [J. H.] Chamberlayne.
Dickenson's Battery, Captain [C.] Dickenson.
Otey's Battery, Captain [D. N.] Walker.

SECOND CORPS ARTILLERY.

Brigadier-General A. L. Long.

Braxton's Battalion.

Major Carter M. Braxton.

Lee Battery, Lieutenant W. W. Hardwicke.
First Maryland Artillery, Captain W. F. Dement.
Stafford Artillery, Captain W. T. Cooper.
Alleghany Artillery, Captain J. C. Carpenter.

Carter's Battalion.

Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas H. Carter.

Morris Artillery, Captain S. H. Pendleton.
Orange Artillery, Captain C. W. Fry.

King William Artillery, Captain William P. Carter.
Jeff. Davis Artillery, Captain W. J. Reese.

Cutshaw's Battalion.

Major [W. E.] Cutshaw.

Charlottesville Artillery, Captain J. McD. Carrington.
Staunton Artillery, Captain A. W. Garber.
Courtney Artillery, Captain W. A. Tanner.

Nelson's Battalion.

Lieutenant-Colonel [William] Nelson.

Amherst Artillery, Captain T. J. Kirkpatrick.
Milledge Artillery, Captain John Milledge.
Fluvanna Artillery, Captain J. L. Massie.

Brown's Battalion.

Colonel J. T. Brown.

Powhatan Artillery, Captain W. J. Dance.
Second Company Richmond Howitzers, Captain L. F. Jones.
Third Company Richmond Howitzers, Captain B. H. Smith, Jr.
Rockbridge Artillery, Captain A. Graham.
Salem Flying Artillery, Captain C. B. Griffin.

THIRD CORPS ARTILLERY.

Colonel R. L. Walker.

Cutts's Battalion.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Cutts.

Ross's Battery, Captain H. M. Ross.
Patterson's Battery, Captain G. M. Patterson.
Irwin Artillery, Captain J. T. Wingfield.

McIntosh's Battalion.

Lieutenant-Colonel D. G. McIntosh.

Johnson's Battery, Captain [V. J. Clutter.]
Hardaway Artillery, Captain W. B. Hurt.
Danville Artillery, Captain R. S. Rice.
Second Rockbridge Artillery, Captain L. Donald.

Richardson's Battalion.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Richardson.

Lewis Artillery, Captain N. Penick.

Donaldsonville Artillery, Captain V. Maurin.

Norfolk Light Artillery, Captain C. R. Grandy.

Huger Artillery, Captain J. D. Moore.

Pegram's Battalion.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. J. Pegram.

Pee Dee Artillery, [Captain E. B. Brunson].

Fredericksburg Artillery, Captain E. A. Marye.

Letcher Artillery, Captain T. A. Brander.

Purcell Battery, [Captain Geo. M. Cayce].

Crenshaw's Battery, Captain T. Ellett.

Poague's Battalion.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. T. Poague.

Madison Artillery, [Captain T. J. Richards].

Albemarle Artillery, Captain J. W. Wyatt.

Brooke Artillery, Captain A. W. Utterback.

Charlotte Artillery, Captain — Williams.

A Northern Opinion of Grant's Generalship.

[The following able criticism of General Grant's claim to great generalship was published in the *New York Tribune* last summer, and is worth preserving as the well digested opinion of one who seems to have risen above the prejudices of the hour and to have written, to some extent at least, in the calm spirit of the true military critic. We do not, of course, endorse all of this writer's statements and conclusions, but that his estimate of Grant will be that of the future historian there can be but little doubt.]

To the Editor of the Tribune:

SIR,—The attitude in which General Grant has so long been posed before the world is likely to receive a severe blow from the publication of General Humphreys's last volume of "The Campaigns of the Civil War," of which the *Tribune* contained a review

yesterday. Most people who read General Humphreys's book will be satisfied, from its frankness of tone, clearness, and accuracy of detail, that he has reached somewhere near the truth of his subject. His statements are indeed tacitly admitted by other writers on the last year of the war in Virginia, but have been either clouded over or not brought forward to the importance they properly deserve. Neither do I understand that he reflects on the mistakes and failures of the Union General with the severity he well might employ, but leaves the reader to draw an evident conclusion for himself.

Colonel Hambley, of the British army, in his great work on the Art of War, a work which I have never seen seriously questioned, speaks of General Grant as one "who was successful on a moderate terrain like Vicksburg, but whose Virginia campaign was a failure," and elsewhere of "Grant's useless sacrifice of ten thousand men at Cold Harbor." This judgment is tacitly supported in General Humphreys's book by what would seem to be a column of indisputable facts. I understand from him that General Grant was at least seven times conspicuously and with enormous loss defeated by General Lee before the exhaustion of his war materials and the universal collapse of the Confederacy compelled the latter to surrender. These were not reported as defeats in the bulletins of the day, and some of them were even supposed to be victories, as in the case of Hancock's magnificent attempt to break through Lee's centre at Spotsylvania Courthouse; but they were defeats nevertheless. When a commander assumes the offensive and is repulsed by the enemy with severe loss, it is a defeat for him and a victory for his antagonist, although it may not be a decisive one. Many things conspired to prevent General Lee's victories from being decisive: The overwhelming superiority of the Union army in numbers and munitions of war, his own lack of absolutely necessary war material—for which we can thank the blockade—the determined bravery of the Union forces, and the lack of an able coadjutor like Stonewall Jackson. One can well believe that had Jackson lived a year longer Grant would not only have been defeated, but, as a consequence of his stubborn adhesion to a single military idea, pretty nearly destroyed. Grant possessed an advantage over all his predecessors in Virginia, that he never was forced to contend with Jackson. With Jackson taken from one side and Sheridan added to the other, it ought not to have been so difficult to get the better of Lee. As it happened, Sheridan's brilliant victory at Cedar Run, a battle gained with *equal* forces and the most decisive ever fought in Virginia, was all that saved us at that period. The dry truth of it is that Grant lost more battles in Virginia than he ever won elsewhere.

General Grant's tactics evidently succeeded in the West on account of their simplicity. They were not too good for the then undisciplined forces which he commanded. He said to General Sherman, I think it was after the capture of Fort Donelson (I may not give his exact words): "I notice at a certain point in our battles that both sides are defeated, but if we only hold on a little after that we whip them awfully." There can be no question as to Grant's fine qualities as a soldier. The man who could make such an observation and act upon it with coolness and decision was born for the battle-field; to possess those qualities of mind which constitute the great strategist and tactician—in short, the qualities of a great General—is an entirely different thing. In the tenacity with which Grant followed out a determination once fixed in his mind, perhaps no man has ever surpassed him; but it was an expensive virtue for his soldiers, as the hundred thousand men he lost in Virginia are a witness. Whether he should have been removed after Cold Harbor, a disastrous blunder only equalled by Burnside's at Fredericksburg, is a difficult matter to determine. If he had been, the final result would not have differed much in all probability.

Yet this man, who happened to receive the surrendered sword of Lee, became on that account the supposed hero of the war; received the credit of having suppressed the Confederacy; without education for or experience in civil affairs was made President for eight years; and finally was carried around the earth and exhibited to the nations as the greatest prodigy of the age. The people in their exuberant joy at the return of peace wished for a hero to whom they could pay homage, and, Lincoln being dead, seized upon Grant as the nearest object. Happier for him and for them had he been allowed to continue, like Sherman and Sheridan, quietly at his post of duty. America does not require celebrities of a false lustre to satisfy her pride. "There are others who are deserving," as Mr. Emerson said.

F. P. S.

COLLEGE HILL, MASS., *July 4, 1883.*

Diary of Rev. J. G. Law.

RETREAT FROM CORINTH.

May 20th, 1862.—Received orders to cook five days' rations, and prepare to march. The general impression is that we are going out to join battle with the enemy. The Rev. Dr. Palmer delivered an elo-

quent and soul-stirring address to our brigade, and concluded with a fervent prayer for the safety of our army, and the success of our righteous cause. The scene was grandly inspiring. Thousands of soldiers stood with uncovered heads while the eloquent divine lifted up his voice to heaven for our protection, and when he read the infamous proclamation of General Butler not a word was spoken, but the firm, resolute look, the compressed lip, and flashing eye of every soldier, said plainer than words could say, that the insolent invaders of our sacred soil should never cross our intrenchments without walking over the dead bodies of sixty thousand determined and indignant men.

I record the infamous proclamation :

"As officers and soldiers of the United States have been subjected to repeated insults from *women*, calling themselves *ladies* of New Orleans, in return for the most scrupulous, non-interference and courtesy on our part, it is ordered, that hereafter, when any female shall by word, gesture, or movement, insult, or show contempt to any officer, or soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded and be held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation."

Oh! monster of iniquity. How long shall our mothers and sisters be subjected to the insults of the barbarian hordes of the North? The Southern heart is fired, and we will go forth baring our breasts to the steel of the foe, and never, no never return to our homes until the insolent invader is driven from our soil; our fair cities rid of his polluting presence, and the honor of the daughters of the South vindicated. General Polk said that we would go into battle with this motto: "Our mothers, our sisters, our daughters, our wives, our country and our God."

May 21st.—The regiment marched out to the Bridge's House this evening for picket duty. We carried with us two days' rations, and left three in the wagons. We also carried with us two tents. We had reached our camping-ground, and were in the act of pitching tents when an order came to send everything back to camp that we could not march with. This indicated a forward movement, and tomorrow we may expect to see the Yankees, and may the Lord have mercy on their souls.

May 22nd.—The army marched out of the entrenchments this morning to attack the enemy. Our brigade, under General Donelson, moved out two miles and formed a line of battle; but for some reason the attack was not made, and we returned to camp to await further orders.

Sunday, May 25th.—On picket. Guard duty is very heavy. Our company only report twenty-eight men for duty, and the detail for guard to-day is fifteen. The army again moved out this evening, but in a short time returned. Sharp skirmishing continues along the lines. Why does not Beauregard move upon Halleck? We would drive him into the Tennessee river at the point of the bayonet. Our movements are tantalizing.

May 26th.—The regiment received orders to burn all extra baggage, and allow only four tents to a company. What does it mean? Surely we are not going to retreat from Corinth? We were also ordered to cook two days' rations. We moved out about one mile in advance of the breastworks, where the "Maynard Rifles" were thrown forward as sharp-shooters. We are on duty for twenty-four hours without relief. An old field separates us from the Yankee sharp-shooters, and we are exchanging shots rapidly.

May 27th.—Twelve o'clock. Half of the day has gone, and I am as yet unharmed by a Yankee bullet. Balls buzz like mosquitoes about my ears whenever I raise my head to see what the Yankees are about. Our position is rather uncomfortable, but it is the post of duty. Night. The long day has come to an end, and we are all safe. Again I have to thank our Heavenly Father for throwing around me the shield of His protection. For twenty-four hours we have been under a constant fire. All through the night and all through the day the sharp crack of the rifle has resounded along the lines of the beligerents, and death-dealing bullets have been aimed at human targets; and yet we are all here to answer to roll-call.

May 28th.—The enemy attacked us on the left with artillery about seven o'clock this morning, shelling our brigade (Donelson's), which was posted in line of battle about one mile in front of the breastworks. As we had no artillery, we were compelled to retire; but, receiving re-inforcements and a battery, advanced, and regained our former position, and held it during the day. The shot and shell fell thick and fast around us; the solid shot tearing up the ground at our feet, and the shell bursting over our heads, in front of us, and behind us. The fighting was severe on the right, where Price and Van Dorn drove the enemy back to their entrenchments. Our tents and baggage were all sent off to-day, and the general impression is that we are about to evacuate Corinth.

May 29th.—All quiet on the left. Heavy cannonading on the right all day. It is now sunset, and we are under orders to march in thirty minutes.

May 30th.—Corinth was evacuated last night. We left there at eleven o'clock, and marched all night and all day, resting a few hours this morning. We are now encamped on the banks of a small stream, about twelve miles from Corinth. At Kossuth, Joe Park and I stopped at the house of a Georgia woman, and got a dinner of corn-bread and buttermilk. I charged Joe with drinking six glasses of milk; Joe brought the same charge against me; the woman charged us both. We settled with the good woman, and our mutual charges vanished in smoke, as we went on our way rejoicing, and whiffed our cares away. It is a great relief to breathe the fresh, pure atmosphere of the country after living so long in the infected camp of Corinth. We do not relish the idea of turning our backs upon the enemy; but we must have confidence in our General, and believe that he is executing a strategical movement.

May 31st.—Left camp late this morning, after a long rest. Marched eight miles, and bivouacked on the banks of a small stream about twenty miles from Corinth. Our rations gave out, and we had no breakfast; but we sent our cook, "Uncle Tom," ahead, and the old darkey met us on the road with some corn-bread. After we halted, rations of flour, sugar, molasses and beef were issued. But we had no cooking utensils, and were obliged to resort to boards and bark in lieu of ovens and skillets. We broiled the beef on sticks. It was really amusing to see the improvised cooking utensils. Some would cover a stick with dough, and hold it over the fire until it was baked. Others would spread the dough on a piece of bark; and so, with the help of boards, bark, and sticks, we managed to get up a respectable feast. General Cheatham acted in the capacity of butcher, shooting the beeves with his pistol. About dark "Bob" came in with mutton and corn-bread, on which we supped heartily; and, lighting my last cigar, I sat down on a log to whiff my cares away and think of the loved ones at home.

June 1st.—Marched fifteen miles. Left our bivouac at three o'clock A. M. and halted at two P. M. Here we came up with our wagons, and got our cooking utensils. Rye was issued, and I enjoyed a cup of rye coffee.

June 5th.—For the past few days rumors have been afloat in camp of a great battle in Virginia. This morning the news was confirmed. We gained a great victory near Richmond. President Davis and General Lee were on the field, and greatly encouraged the troops by their presence. General Jackson routed Banks, and is said to be approaching Washington. The Marylanders are flocking to his standard by the thousands. It is also reported that General Beaure-

gard has been advised of the intervention of France and England in American affairs. This is news enough for one day.

June 7th.—Resumed our march to-day. Left camp at two o'clock P. M., and halted at sunset. Marched about ten miles. Suffered more fatigue than on any previous march.

Sunday June 8th.—Left camp this morning at three o'clock, and halted at nine, having reached our destination. We are encamped in a beautiful grove of young oaks; a fine spring of clear water is close at hand, and we are all pleased with our location. Although greatly fatigued, I was detailed for fatigue duty, and worked all the morning, cleaning up the camp-ground. Mr. Chrisp, McKnight, Hill and I started out in the afternoon in search of a supper. About one mile and a half from camp we came up to a neat little cottage. It proved to be the residence of a minister. We were kindly received, and after resting an hour or so were invited into a real home supper. The table was spread with rich egg-bread, fried ham, and pure coffee with cream and sugar. We paid the good woman for her trouble, and returned to camp refreshed in body and soul.

June 9th.—My friend Pinckney Latham called to see me this morning, and we spent the afternoon sitting on an old bench near a country church talking about the good old times when we played marbles together. While we were thus pleasantly engaged, an ambulance came up, and we were requested by the driver to assist him in lifting out the corpse of a soldier who had died on the march. The poor fellow was a Mississippi volunteer and far away from friends and home, he was rudely buried in the little country church-yard; and a board with his name roughly inscribed on its, unpolished surface marks his resting place. If his name is written in the Lamb's Book of Life, it is a small matter whether it be inscribed here on a rough board or on a polished marble shaft.

June 10th.—Reveille this morning at two o'clock. Broke camp and resumed our march. Halted at one o'clock, worn out with a tiresome march of eighteen miles over a hot dusty road. We are encamped about four miles from Tupelo.

Sunday June 15th.—The day has been oppressively warm. Dr. Erskine, Major Bulkley, Frank Gowan and Bob Wright called to see me this morning. Spent the afternoon strolling through the woods and fields, meditating, and eating blackberries.

June 16th.—Spent the day playing chess with Dr. Erskine. Received a letter from home, written since the Federals have occupied Memphis

June 17th.—Hartsfield and I are on guard to-day at General Polk's

headquarters. The old 154th was to-day transferred to the brigade of General Preston Smith.

June 21st.—Our tents arrived from Okalona, and I will sleep under shelter to-night for the first time in a month. Graybacks have invaded our camp and are hard to repel. Mr. Chrisp was complaining of the invaders when Spivey claimed exemption from the common scourge. It was too much for the old gentleman, and bristling up, he gave Spivey a piece of his mind. "Spivey," he said, "if there is a soldier in this army who is not troubled with these pestilent camp-followers, there is something about that man that graybacks don't like, and that is all that I have to say about it." I think if Mr. Chrisp had the privilege of amending the book of prayer used in the Episcopal Church, he would have this clause inserted: "From graybacks and all kindred species, good Lord, deliver us," and Spivey would say, Amen.

July 1st.—This has been a delightful day. We were visited by a refreshing shower this morning which cooled the atmosphere, and revived the life of the camp. For several days past the air has been full of rumors of a great battle in Virginia, in which McClellan was signally defeated. Last night after we had all retired to our soldier couches, we were called up to hear a dispatch from General Randolph, Secretary of War, announcing a glorious victory for our arms. The battle commenced on Friday, and after two days' desperate fighting, the enemy abandoned their camp, and fled. They recrossed the Chickahominy for the purpose of getting under the protection of their gunboats on the James river. Latest reports represent our army in hot pursuit of the retreating foe, and capturing many thousands of prisoners. I have been suffering for several days from an attack of acute rheumatism, but the good news puts me on my feet again.

July 4th.—The Fourth of July, 1862, has passed unobserved and almost unknown. The principles for which our forefathers contended have been trampled beneath the feet of their unworthy descendants of the North, and we, their sons of the South are fighting their battles over again. No booming of cannon is heard, unless it be in Virginia, the mother of statesmen, where the last scenes of one of the bloodiest tragedies ever enacted on the American Continent are about closing. The curtain will drop, and the victorious army of the South will prove to the North, and to the World, that a people determined to be free can never be conquered. When our independence is achieved, then we will celebrate our independence day. I am on guard at Gen-

eral Polk's spring. Have spent the day reading "Georgia Scenes."

July 5th.—This has been a day of rejoicing in camp. The deep-booming of cannon, the enthusiastic cheering of the troops, and the martial music of our regimental bands mingle together in a flood of harmony. The firing of cannon was by order of General Bragg in honor of our great victory in Virginia. Latest dispatches announce that we have captured two Major-Generals, four Brigadier-Generals, over seven thousand prisoners, seventy-five pieces of artillery, fifteen thousand stand of small arms, and that McClellan and the remnant of his army are surrounded by our forces, and would be compelled to capitulate. General Bragg's proclamation to the troops on assuming command of the army was read out on dress-parade this evening. Three cheers for our brave boys in Virginia.

Flag Presentation to the Washington Artillery.

[On Monday, May the 28th, 1883, the famous old Washington Artillery had their annual re-union and banquet at their armory, in New Orleans.

We regret that the crowded condition of our pages has prevented us from giving an earlier notice of the interesting occasion, or giving now any of the details save a condensed report of the Address of Judge Roman in presenting to the battalion, on behalf of General Beauregard, a historic Confederate flag. To say that Colonel J. B. Richardson presided on the occasion—that Colonel Walton received the flag—and that the whole affair was arranged by a well-selected committee of the battalion—is to give assurance that it was a splendid success.]

JUDGE ALFRED ROMAN'S ADDRESS

Judge Roman, after expressing the pleasure with which he, on the part of General Beauregard, now absent from the city, had been chosen to speak to the battalion on so interesting a mission, proceeded to speak of the early events of the war, when the armies of the North and the South were confronting each other on the opposite banks of the Potomac. He spoke also of the exciting and dramatic events of the battle of Bull Run; how the first Confederate flag, of the stars and bars, was so much like the United States standard that it was impossible, in the confusion of battle, to distinguish one from the other. So serious was this difficulty on the first field of Manas-

sas that the timely appearance of the forces of General Early, with his brigade of Virginia, Louisiana, and Mississippi troops, on the extreme right flank of the enemy, thereby insuring their defeat on that historic day, had well-nigh caused ruin to the Confederates, because Early's troops were supposed to be a part of the enemy's forces, and it was with difficulty that they could be distinguished by their flag.

After this graphic and brilliant introduction, which want of space has here required to be curtailed, the eloquent speaker continued as follows:

General Beauregard had determined that no troops of his command would again be exposed to such a mistake, and he did all in his power to accomplish that end, General Johnston, as the Commander-in-Chief of our united forces, greatly assisting him in his efforts. General Beauregard first endeavored, through Colonel Miles, of South Carolina, chairman of the House Military Committee in the Confederate Congress, to have our national flag entirely changed. Failing in this he proposed a battle flag different in every respect to any State or Federal flag hitherto used. Finally the three senior Generals, at Fairfax Courthouse—Generals Johnston, Beauregard and G. W. Smith—met in conference in the latter part of September, and after examining many designs—for many had been sent—"one of several presented by General Beauregard," says General Johnston, "was selected. I modified it," he continues, "only by making the shape square instead of oblong, and prescribed the different sizes for infantry, artillery and cavalry."

Such was the origin of the battle-flag of the Army of the Potomac, as it was first called, which soon became the rallying emblem of every Confederate soldier, whatever the army he served in, and following which he showed on many a bloody field, from and after Manassas to the battle of Bentonville, the last of the war, that numbers did not always stand in the way of victory.

Its field was red or crimson, its bars blue with a narrow white fillet separating the red from the blue. On the bars, which formed a Greek cross, were stars, white or gold, equal in number to the States in the Confederacy. Its size was four feet by four for infantry, three feet by three for artillery, two feet and a half by two and a half for cavalry. This design, by a very singular coincidence, had been devised by Colonel Miles, of South Carolina, and offered to Congress as the Confederate flag as early as March, 1861. It had likewise been

executed by Mr. Edward C. Hancock, of New Orleans, at the request of Colonel J. B. Walton, in April of the same year, and it was, in reality, the Hancock-Walton design, if I may call it so, which was proposed by General Beauregard at the conference just referred to, and which, with the modification decided upon by General Johnston, became the renowned and glorious battle-flag of our Southern armies. It was finally merged in and adopted as the union of the regular Confederate colors, whose field, as we know, was of pure white. Major Cabell, Chief Quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac, was ordered to make the battle-flags necessary for the different branches of the service, and they were distributed to the troops with appropriate ceremonies, on the 28th of November, 1861.

Some weeks before that time, and while the troops were about to be drawn back to Centreville for winter quarters, three Confederate battle-flags, the first that were made, according to the design and size agreed upon, were brought to General Beauregard's headquarters, under the special charge of a young officer of his command, who bore with them a touching note explaining their desired destination, and expressive of the noble feelings actuating those from whose hands—no, those from whose hearts—they came. One of them was for General Johnston, another for General Beauregard, the third for General Van Dorn, then in command of the First Division of the Army of the Potomac; and each was labeled accordingly, to prevent all possible error.

The donors of these three battle-flags were among the fairest and loveliest women of the South. The women of the South! How beautifully those words sound to the ear! What rythmical grace is contained in them! And to us, especially to those who wore the gray, how emblematic they are of all that is good, and pure, and generous and lofty and patriotic! Ah! surely we loved the cause for the success of which we pledged our fortunes and our lives; but would we have been so devoted to it, would we have borne all our sufferings so uncomplainingly, from beginning to end, had not the women of the South evinced such deep, undying faith in the principles it embodied? I dare not say. They encouraged those dearest to them to rush to the front, buckled on their armor and blessed them with their whole souls upon their leaving for the field, knowing, alas! that many would never return. They did more; and the noble services they rendered in the hospitals, whether in camp, city or village, and the material assistance they gave to the troops at such cost to themselves, will ever deserve and obtain from the Confederate soldier,

wherever he may be, and whatever may have been his fate, and from his children when he will have passed away, a most endeared remembrance and an unbounded gratitude.

Two young ladies of Baltimore, of uncommon beauty and great intellectual attainments—Miss Hettie Carey and her sister, Miss Jennie Carey, had been compelled to leave their native State, Maryland, by reason of what was termed "*sedition sentiments and conduct*;" the plain meaning of which was their outspoken sympathy for the South. After being transferred across the lines, they made their temporary home in Richmond, with a near relative, Miss Constance Carey, formerly of Alexandria, Va., their equal, it appears, in every respect. Being true women of the South, and living as they did in the Confederate capital, they soon became informed of the action taken by Generals Johnston and Beauregard, to procure a battle-flag for our troops. Their programme was adopted at once, and, with busy and skillful hands, cutting up and using their own silk dresses for the purpose, they fashioned the three beautiful banners I have described, which were sent to the three Generals who had most attracted their admiration. The note accompanying this gracious gift—note which unfortunately cannot be found—was written by Miss Hettie Carey, whose fair and nimble fingers had made the flag specially intended for General Beauregard.

What Generals Johnston and Van Dorn did with their flag, I cannot say, though I am sure they valued them much; but I know that General Beauregard, almost religiously preserved his, and looked upon it somewhat in the light of a relic. We have the proof of it before us now, for here is the identical flag given him by Miss Hettie Carey, afterwards the wife of General Pegram, the heroic Pegram, killed in battle around Petersburg, at the end of the war, leaving to mourn his untimely death, besides near relatives and comrades in arms, a widowed bride of scarce two weeks' marriage.

After keeping this precious memento a short time at his headquarters, at Centreville, where it was greatly admired, and shown as a model for those ordered for the army, General Beauregard finally sent it to New Orleans for security and preservation. When our city fell, in April, 1862, that banner and General Beauregard's swords of honor were conveyed to a French war steamer, then lying in the port, and taken to Havana. There they remained, under the care of a Spanish gentleman known to be in sympathy with the South, until safely returned, some three years after the close of the struggle.

And now, officers and soldiers of the Washington Artillery, in the name of General Beauregard, under whose eyes you first went under fire, at Bull Run and Manassas, and—besides your brilliant achievements in fifty-six other battles and engagements—under whom you again distinguished yourselves, on the bloody field of Shiloh, with Hodgson, Slocomb, McVaught, Hewes, and Chalaron, and, later on, at Drewry's Bluff, with Eschleman, W. M. Owen, Richardson, Hero and Norcum, I have the honor to present to you this sacred emblem of Southern valor and patriotism. Its colors are yet as fresh as when it received the parting look of its fair maker. Its value is enhanced by the fact that the upper portion of its staff is made of a piece of the flag-staff of Fort Sumter, shot down by the Confederate gunners, in April, 1861. Unsullied though it be by the smoke of battle, it was, none the less, born in war, and the breeze first kissed it in the tented field. It is the genuine model of the glorious flag around which all of us fought, and so many of us bled, and so many of us fell. Colonel Richardson, I now intrust it to your hands. The Washington Artillery is worthy of it; it is, in every respect, worthy of the Washington Artillery. General Beauregard, who will ever regret his enforced absence from among you on this occasion, knows that it will be treasured and revered by you, and that it will find a fitting place among the many trophies and decorations which already adorn the walls of your vast armory. He trusts that, in the peaceful years succeeding the troublous era, over which we have just cast a backward glance, it will serve you and those under you as a touching reminder, not only of himself, your fast friend and former commander, but also of her from whose love and devotion to a cause dear to us—then, now, and I say forever—it originally came.

Reminiscences of the Last Campaign of the Army of Tennessee, from May, 1864, to January, 1865.

By P. D. STEPHENSON, *Private Piece 4, Sergeant Thomas C. Allen, Fifth Company Washington Artillery, Captain C. H. Slocomb, Commanding.*

PAPER NO. I.

[NOTE BY THE WRITER: This is not from a "diary." Early after the war, in June, 1865, the writer sat down and began to put on paper, merely for his own future satisfaction, what was still fresh in his memory of that famous last campaign. What is written is from a

private's standpoint. Its only merit is sincerity. On the principle that everything may be of use that bears upon the war, it is offered for what it is worth.]

"AFTER MISSIONARY RIDGE."

It was whilst we, the shattered remnants of Bragg's army, lay cowering among the hills of Dalton, Ga., in the winter of 1863, that General Joseph E. Johnston came to us and assumed command.

He arrived on the 27th of December, and immediately bent all his energies to the almost superhuman task before him: the task of shaping from a starved, ragged, ill-used mob of men, a disciplined command, which in three months' time was to be the sole defense, the sole obstacle, against the mighty and splendidly-equipped army of Sherman.

I call his task a superhuman one—and justly so. The calamity which preceded his arrival, and, indeed, made his presence necessary, was one of the most mournful events in our Confederacy's mournful existence, and it had a lasting influence on the subsequent fortunes of our ill-fated cause. Following so soon after the overwhelming victory of Chickamauga, the defeat at Missionary Ridge was an astounding revelation of bad management *some*-where, and of the rapidity with which a fine army can be demoralized.

The battle of Chickamauga was won by hard fighting. It was emphatically a victory for the *men*. But indifferently armed and equipped, with little discipline, they turned on a pursuing army, one-third larger than their own, carried their breastworks, forced them back from their positions, and at last put them to an overwhelming rout.

This was the work of men who had just retreated one hundred and eight miles. It seems strange that under such depressing circumstances they could have preserved so well their *morale*, and so gallantly have done their duty. But it is easily explained. Every veteran soldier knows that a well-regulated retreat does not materially affect the spirits of the men. Our withdrawal from Tennessee was such an one. It was conducted quietly and systematically. Although the rigors of military law had then little or no existence in our camp, and we, therefore, were not in a high state of discipline, yet our march was an orderly one, and the men were cheerful and well-disposed. They had many good causes for being so. They had never known defeat, and although that absurd notion, that their foes were naturally cowards, had long been abandoned, their expe-

rience on several fields had sufficed to give them just confidence in their own ability. Their experience at Corinth, Miss., had amply proven to them that a retreat is not always a disaster, for had they not afterwards turned around and threatened Cincinnati itself? "Who knows," said they, "but this falling back is but the presage to another advance into Kentucky, more glorious and more permanent than the first?" And, again, their confidence in their leader, General Bragg, although not great, was still sufficient to preserve them from demoralization. They knew that he was a skillful officer, although not a great commander. They thought he was safe and careful, and therefore, although not likely to do great deeds, yet was, on the other hand, not likely to expose them to great disaster. All this they felt towards him, although he was never personally popular. His men never forgot his harshness at the outset of his career, and all his subsequent laxity of discipline could never wipe out the first impressions of his "tyranny." But their wants had in a measure been supplied. Their rations were sufficient, their clothing passable, they had not been through the extreme privations and destitutions which were the daily attendants of their subsequent campaign. So they preserved a hopeful and buoyant disposition, and can be said to have been in as high a state of efficiency as a volunteer army could, under the circumstances, arrive at.

Under such encouraging auspices did Bragg fight at Chickamauga. He had received large reinforcements from Virginia, consisting of two divisions of Longstreet's corps, and also other accessions from different portions of the country. His whole force was about seventy-five thousand men; but for some reason not over fifty-five thousand were actually engaged. Rosecrans carried into battle an army which equalled, if it did not exceed, our entire command.

From the unusual combinations on our side, it looks as if our leaders intended to verify the hopes of the men, and after completely annihilating the enemy, to advance and take permanent possession of Tennessee and Kentucky. The opportunity seemed a golden one. Rosecrans had, in his eagerness, placed himself in the snare made for him. His forces were divided, and ours for once, equal in numbers to the foe, formed one united and enthusiastic band. The battle, as has been said already, was fought with but a little over two-thirds of our entire army, and Bragg had a force of over twenty thousand fresh men, with which to complete the rout. Why he did not do so, I have not the means of determining. He charged General Polk with negligence, and the latter was relieved temporarily of his command.

Yet General Bragg's complaint could not have made much impression at Richmond, for Polk, after remaining under suspension a few days, was given an even more responsible position than he had held before.

The real cause of the blunder is open to conjecture. It was generally remarked at the time that Bragg did not seem to know how complete his victory had been. The bold front which Thomas made with his single corps, had the same effect on Bragg which General Forrest's conduct on a similar occasion, a year after, had on himself. Many officers, it was said, high in rank, were for marching into Chattanooga, even after a lapse of several days. The reports of the people by whose doors we passed in our advance to Missionary Ridge, confirmed the universal conviction of the complete demoralization of the enemy. Yet we contented ourselves, with what we had done, and soon afterwards, from the heights of Missionary Ridge, in the rapidly increasing fortifications of the foe, and his daily reinforcements, beheld the *real fruits* of that contest grow more and more impossible to obtain.

Our sojourn on Missionary Ridge was the introduction to that series of privations, which, imposed, as it seemed to us in the ranks, by the incompetency and indifference of our leaders, did more to ruin the army than almost anything else.

General Bragg, although beseiger, began to make preparations to resist an attack. During several days while he was entrenching, the enemy was summoning all his energies to strengthen his ranks, and it was not long before we heard of immense reinforcements, pouring through the mountains to the rescue. General U. S. Grant was with them and they gave prompt notice to Bragg of their approach by surprising his extreme left, and thereby opening a way to Chattanooga. Their arrival swelled their numbers to over a hundred thousand men, and, combined with the presence of their one successful leader, Grant, gave new zeal and courage to the old whipped army of Rosecrans.

Our commander made but feeble attempts at entrenchment, and after his enemy had made the great accessions to his forces above referred to, General Bragg detached Longstreet's corps and hurried it off to besiege Knoxville. Even the day before the battle, our command was withdrawn from our position on the Ridge (I was then in Cleburne's command) and we lay some time, irresolutely at the depot, waiting, as we supposed, to be sent to reinforce Longstreet.

Thus, by his own act, our commander seemed to make his position

untenable. Had it been held by sufficient numbers, Missionary Ridge could never have been stormed. The real cause and manner of its capture will appear hereafter.

Our stay on "The Ridge" was attended with a great deal of suffering. It was mid-winter, and the low-grounds behind us (that fearful "Chickamauga bottom"), over which ran our roads of supplies, were nearly all the time covered with water. "Corduroy roads" were built for miles, yet every rain would undo all our work and make it worse than before. The weather was stormy, and the camps would be flooded day and night. Winter quarters were not allowed to be built, and we therefore had no shelter. Starvation seemed to stare us in the face. For weeks at a time, we subsisted on two meals a day, and those "meals" were a small "pone" of corn-bread, and a cup of "corn coffee." Our duties, meantime, were increased, for our ranks had been lessened, and the enemy were becoming active and annoying. Sickness, for the first time since our stay in and around Corinth (Miss.), broke out in our ranks, and many were swept away. Demoralization spread fearfully among those men, who, but a few days before, had gained one of the bloodiest victories of the war. "Our sufferings are great," said they, "but we could bear them, if we felt there was no help for it." It was their secret conviction that there was help, and that they were the victims of official blunders. Their disaffection was increased by the rumors of bickerings among our leaders. Reports of quarrels between Bragg and his leading officers came down to us, and his removing from command, on the eve of the battle, one of the most popular Generals in the army, Frank Cheatham, looked very much like a confirmation of the reports. So, between the dissensions of the leaders and the various causes of discontent among the men, the army grew rapidly demoralized. The withdrawal of Longstreet to East Tennessee, together with the sickness which existed, had thinned the ranks greatly, so that at the time of the battle we did not have thirty thousand men. (In many places in the line, our men were in single rank, and sprinkled seven or eight feet apart, and there were gaps where there were no men at all.) Our sufferings from hunger were such that Bragg was on the point of withdrawing (such was the general impression) when the attack of the enemy began. It was thought, too, that it was a doubtful question: which was the most famished, the besiegers or besieged? General Grant must have had very accurate accounts of our condition; for, unless he did, his movement was a very bold one. Had those thirty thousand men been able to cover all the ground, he

would have lost terribly, ere he had gained his point. Even as it was, it is likely that starvation alone pushed him to that venture. It was a struggle for life on both sides, with this difference: that whilst Grant was wielding four times our force, and had an army revived in spirit and enthusiastic in its confidence in him, our little remnant, torn by dissensions, and shorn of strength, was placed in such a condition that a victory was an absurdity, and a defeat our only salvation. We were expected to defend a front of six or seven miles, exposed for the whole distance, by the nature of the country, to surprises and snares, but particularly so upon our left. That portion of our line rested on Lookout Mountain, but was cut off from the rest by the deep ravine which separated the mountain from the ridge. It was first attacked and routed, and what few men we had there nearly all killed or captured. That deep, intervening ravine was the door through which "fighting Joe Hooker" entered and gained easy access to our rear, for the simple reason that there was no one for him to "fight." We had not men enough to guard the point. Whilst the storming of the ridge was going on, the enemy were pouring, almost unmolested, through this road, and had not the defection of our troops taken place, we would all have been captured by night. As it was, our centre broke, almost without striking a blow. The men on the left and right were compelled to give way, and before nine o'clock that night the Yankees, with loud and prolonged shouts, were busy lighting their camp fires along the whole length of the ridge.

That day was not one of universal defection. Indeed it is a well known fact that we, on the extreme right, did not even know of any disaster until, after dark, the word came to fall back. We had been fighting all day, and had repulsed the enemy at every point. That was a disgraceful day for us, and yet never did battle-field witness grander heroism than was seen on the right of our line. Both sides showed it. Sherman (for we fought Sherman) threw his blue waves fiercely against us again and again, all day long, and several times they dashed up to our very barricades. (We had thrown up a hasty shelter of logs, rails and whatever we could find on the ground at the moment, on arriving there that morning). One standard bearer, a mere boy, planted his flag on our breastworks, and our men, in admiration, refused to shoot, but contented themselves with capturing him. Several of our regiments got out of ammunition, and fought them back with stones and clubbed muskets. We took several hundred prisoners. The conflict ended only with the night.

We were resting and congratulating ourselves on the events of the day, when the news from the centre and left came, and we found that we were defeated; nay, that the enemy already had possession of the ridge, and that we were in danger of being cut off. We were compelled at once to withdraw, and by rapid marching throw ourselves between the enemy and our retreating army.

The humiliating incidents of that rout, I shall never forget. Yet one thing occurred which relieved in part the monotony of our shame. The enemy pursued us closely, and flushed with victory, grew rash. They came after us without even throwing out the necessary skirmishers. A severe check given them at "Ringgold Gap," by our division, General Cleburne's, then the rear guard of the army, not only taught them caution, but virtually stopped the pursuit. We held the field until evening, then retired about a mile, to a more commanding position, and after waiting for them to come on, leisurely sauntered off under cover of the smoke of our camp fires, which we had ostentatiously built, and which we fed anew just before retiring. The enemy barely made an appearance before this new position and that was all. The extreme, gingerly way in which solitary individuals, one by one, tip-toed towards us and at last showed themselves, was absurdly conclusive of the fact that their rashness was cured. We had fought ourselves into a good humor again, and satisfied that the worst was over, trudged along after the rest of the army.

One little incident in that sharp fight (or rather battle, for I suppose there were twelve or fifteen thousand men engaged, taking both sides) reminds me of General Taylor's "a little more grape, Captain Bragg." Our regiment was placed right across the gap, and our company right *in* it (Thirteenth Regiment, Arkansas Volunteers). We were supporting two pieces of a battery, double-shotted with canister, placed there to sweep the railroad which ran through the gap. Down the railroad, right towards us, came a solid body of men, in marching order, column of fours (a part of Osterhaus's division, we understood), unsuspecting, and thoroughly off their guard; on, on, until I suppose those poor creatures got within almost fifty yards of us. Then, General Cleburne, who was in our midst, watching them through field glasses, almost sprang into the air, clapped his knee, and in his broad Irish brogue, shouted, "NOW, *Cawptain*, give it to 'em, NOW"!!

Poor fellows! That was a fearful blast! It went full into the head of the column. Our guns continued for some time, volley after vol-

ley. After the smoke cleared away, that solid body was no where visible—only patches of men scattered all over the field, and running to the rear as fast as their legs could carry them.

But to return.

Such partial victories, however brilliant, could not alas! retrieve the completeness of our rout. When the remnants of the Army of Tennessee had reached Dalton, Georgia, all order had well-nigh vanished. The men for the most part, cowed and disheartened, both by the humiliating rout they had undergone, and the sufferings they were enduring, began to desert in large numbers. General Bragg himself, left us soon after we reached Dalton. Whilst on the ridge he had done his best to rally the men, but he found his voice unheeded. It was then he discovered how little were the love and respect his soldiers bore him. He was forced to see all personal example entirely unnoticed, all threats and entreaties entirely disregarded, whilst the men shorn of that prestige which had always been theirs, and of that sturdy self-confidence which had served to win all former victories, worn out with two months' famine, privation and dissensions, execrated and denounced him as the author of all their misfortunes.

It was in this state of mind that we arrived at Dalton. Our sufferings were such as we had never known before, for the winter was upon us with all its rigor. And conscious of having inflicted one of the greatest calamities of the war, upon the cause we fought for, and of acting as a body, ignominiously, and yet feeling that we were not responsible for the result of affairs, and were not deserving of the stigma which the whole country would certainly put upon us, we were controlled by a feeling of reckless despair, when Johnston arrived.

Capture of the Confederate Steamer Florida, by the U. S. Steamer Wachusett.

Report of LIEUTENANT T. K. PORTER.

[The following report we copy from Captain Bulloch's "Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe" where it is published for the first time.

The gallant and accomplished officer who commanded the Florida at the time, and who wrote the report was *Lieutenant Thomas K. Porter*, who commanded "Porter's Battery" at Fort Donelson with such skill and courage, who was a brother of the soldier-statesman,

ex-Governor James D. Porter, of Tennessee, and whose death was deeply lamented by a wide circle of friends and admirers.]

To Lieutenant-Commander C. M. MORRIS,
Confederate States Navy.

LIVERPOOL, February 20th, 1865.

SIR,—In obedience to orders I submit the following report of the capture of the Confederate States steamer *Florida* at Bahia, Brazil, on the 7th of October, 1864, by the United States steamer *Wachusett*, the treatment of the officers and crew while prisoners; and the manner of our release. But before commencing I beg to call your attention to the fact that before entering the harbor our shot were withdrawn from the guns; that after our being requested by the Brazilian naval commander to anchor in-shore of his squadron we let our steam go down and hauled fires.

At about 3 A. M. on the morning of the 7th October, the officer of the deck, Acting-Master T. T. Hunter, sent the Quartermaster down to call me, and tell me that the *Wachusett* was under weigh and standing towards us. I immediately jumped on deck, when I saw the *Wachusett* about twenty yards off, standing for our starboard quarter. A moment after she struck us abreast the mizen-mast, broke it into three pieces, crushed in the bulwarks, knocked the quarter-boat in on deck, jammed the wheel, carried away the mainyard and started the beams for about thirty feet forward. At the same time she fired about two hundred shots from her small arms, and two from her great guns. She then backed off about one hundred yards, and demanded our surrender. I replied to the demand that I would let them know in a few moments. The reply from the *Wachusett* was to surrender immediately, or they would blow us out of the water. As more than half our crew were ashore, and those on board had just returned from liberty, I believed that she could run us down before we could get our guns loaded. But as I did not like to surrender the vessel without knowing what some of the other officers thought of it, I consulted Lieutenant Stone, the second officer in rank; and finding that he agreed with me that we could not contend against her with any hopes of success, I informed the commander of the *Wachusett* that under the circumstances I would surrender the vessel. I then went on board, and delivered to Commander Collins the ship's ensign and my sword. He immediately sent a prize-crew on board the *Florida*, and towed her out of the harbor. During the day he transferred about

two-thirds of those captured to the *Wachusett*. He then paroled the officers, and put the men in double irons. As there were so few men compared to the *Wachusett's* crew, and those divided between the two ships, I tried to get Captain Collins to allow the irons to be taken off of all, or a part of them, during the day, but he refused to do so. Beyond keeping the men in double irons for nearly two months, there were but two cases of severity towards them that were reported to me. Henry Norman (cox.) was ironed to a stanchion with his hands behind him for having the key of a pair of the *Florida's* irons in his pocket. He, as well as all the other men on the *Wachusett*, was ironed with the irons belonging to her (the *Wachusett*). John Brogan (fireman) was kept in the sweat-box. Dr. Emory reported to me that he was sick and could not stand such treatment. I asked Captain Collins to tell me why he was so treated. His reply was that Brogan was seen talking, and that when his master-at-arms came up he stopped. He also said that Brogan had, the day the *Florida* was captured cursed one of his engineers, who tried to get him to show him something about our engines. He said, though, that he had ordered his release two days before, and thought he had been taken out. This was about three weeks after our capture. Brogan informed me afterwards that he had been confined there for several days, and eighteen nights. A few days before going into St. Thomas, I went to Captain Collins and told him that on a previous occasion he had informed me that he was going to put our men ashore at Pernambuco, and that as we would be in port a few days, I would like to know if he still intended to put them ashore, at the same time telling him that I thought the *Florida* would be given up by his Government, and that I thought any honorable man would try to return the ship and crew as nearly in the condition in which he found her as he could. His reply was, "I have not thought of it—I have not thought of it to-day." After further conversation I left him, believing that he would not try to break up the crew. But before leaving St. Thomas our men were informed that all of them who wished to go ashore could do so, and that Master George D. Bryan and one other officer would meet them to look out for them. They asked what was to become of their money, which had been taken from them, and were told that Mr. Bryan would take it ashore for them. A number of them thought this was a trick to get rid of them, and would not go, but eighteen were foolish enough to believe it, and had their irons taken off on the berth-deck, and were put in a boat from the bow port, and allowed to go ashore. The first Mr. Bryan heard of his part of the affair was

when we left the *Wachusett* and had an opportunity of talking to the other men. After the men had time to get ashore, the commander of the *Wachusett* called away his boats, and sent an armed force after the boat in which our men had left. So anxious was he to get them ashore, that he sent them when the quarantine flag was flying at his fore in consequence of having the small-pox on board. The United States steamer *Keasarge* left St. Thomas while we were there, and Dr. Charlton and the eighteen men on the *Florida* were transferred to her. When we arrived at Fortress Monroe, we were sent up to Point Lookout Prison, and there the officers were separated from the men, and sent to the Old Capitol Prison in Washington. But in three or four days we were sent back to the *Wachusett* at Fortress Monroe to go to Fort Warren, Boston. On our return to Fortress Monroe, I heard that the *Florida's* money-chest had been opened, and I went to Captain Collins and reminded him that soon after we were captured, I informed him that there were three hundred and twenty dollars in it which belonged to the wardroom mess, which I had given to the paymaster the evening before we were captured, to keep till the caterer, Lieutenant Stone, should return from shore. He told me that he had mentioned it to Rear-Admiral Porter, but that the Admiral refused to give it to us. We saw the *Florida* before we left. She had lost her jibboom by a steam-tug running into her. A Lieutenant-Commander told me that if the United States Government determined to give her up, the officers of the navy would destroy her. Several other of our officers were told the same. Whilst in Fort Warren we heard these threats were carried out.

From Hampton Roads we were carried in the *Wachusett* to Boston, but before we were sent to Fort Warren, Lieutenant-Commander Beardsly went to the men and informed them that he was sent by Captain Collins to tell them that if they would take the oath of allegiance to the United States Government they would be released. He, meeting with no success, was succeeded by the master-at-arms of the vessel, and a sergeant from the Fort, who told them that all the men but five of those who had come from St. Thomas on the *Keasarge* had taken the oath. I do not know by whose orders this was told them; but we found on arriving at the fort that it had no more truth in it than the report they gave the men at St. Thomas, that Mr. Bryan was to meet them on shore. I am happy to say that but one of the crew deserted his flag, and he did it the day we were captured. When we arrived at Fort Warren, the men were all put in one room, and the eleven officers were put into one with thirty-two other pris-

oners. These rooms were casemates, and were fifty feet long and about eighteen feet wide. At sunset we were locked up in these casemates, and released after sunrise, and allowed to promenade the extent of five such rooms. At 8 A. M. we were marched around to the cookhouse, and were all given one loaf of bread each, weighing fourteen ounces. After twelve we were marched around again, and were given our dinner, which consisted of about eight ounces of cooked meat, with half a pint of thin soup, three days, and two potatoes, some beans or hominy the other days. This was all we received each day. Many of the prisoners by economizing found this enough to appease their hunger, but a great many others were hungry all the time. If we had been allowed to buy sugar and coffee, and bread and cheese, a great many would have been able to do so, and divide with some of their friends who had no means, but we were allowed to buy nothing to eat without a certificate from the Post Surgeon that we were sick. There is an arrangement between our government and that of the United States, that prisoners-of-war may be allowed to receive boxes of provisions and clothing from their friends at home, but the United States Government now interprets this to mean that all boxes must come by a flag of truce. As half of the Confederate prisoners have their homes within what is now the United States military lines, this agreement works almost entirely for the Federals and against us. Half of the *Florida's* officers were in this situation, and they were compelled to decline the offers of their friends. On the 24th December all the *Florida's* officers except Dr. Charlton and fourteen other prisoners were locked up in a casemate, and kept in close confinement both day and night. We were not allowed to go out under any circumstances, except that for the first four days we were marched under a heavy guard to the cookhouse twice a day. After that our dinner was brought to us, and two of us were marched around to get the bread for all of those confined. This was for discussing a plan to capture the fort, which one of the prison spies, who pretends to be a Lieutenant-Colonel in our army, and a Lieutenant in the English army, revealed to the authorities. We were kept in close confinement until the 19th of January, when Lieutenant Woodman, of the United States army, sent for me, and told me that he had an order from the Secretary of the Navy to release the officers and crew of the *Florida* from Fort Warren, and that as such was the case he would release all of us from close confinement. He showed me the order from the Secretary of the Navy, which was that we would be released on condition that we signed a parole to leave the United

States within ten days. I asked him if we would be given the money and our swords, and other articles captured on the *Florida*, which had not been sunk with her. He said that he knew nothing about them, but if I wished to write to Mr. Welles, he would send the communication. I then gave him a copy of the following note, which he assured me was sent the same day:

"To the Hon. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy:

"FORT WARREN, *January 19th, 1863.*

"SIR,—I have just been informed by the commanding officer of this fort that the officers and crew of the Confederate States steamer *Florida* will be released on condition of leaving the United States within ten days. We will accept a parole to leave at any time when we are put on board any steamer going to Europe, but we would prefer to go to Richmond. We would call your attention to the fact that there were somewhere about thirteen thousand dollars in gold on the *Florida* when she was captured, which was taken out of her by order of Rear-Admiral Porter. And to leave the United States it will be necessary to have that to take us out, unless the United States Government send us away as they brought us in. If you will give us our money we would prefer remaining here till a steamer leaves here for Europe, or we would ask for a guard till we are put on one in New York, as so many of us being together might be the cause of an unnecessary disturbance, of which we would be the sufferers.

"Very respectfully,

"Your obedient servant,

"THOMAS K. PORTER,

"*First-Lieutenant, Confederate States Navy.*"

Mr. Welles made no reply to this. After waiting a week and finding that the United States Government neither intended to pay our passage away, nor to give us the money belonging to our government, and not even our private money, I sent Lieutenant Stone to Boston with directions to procure a passage in the British and North American steamer *Canada*, or if he failed in that, to get us out of the United States in any manner possible. He succeeded in getting passage for all of us on the *Canada*, by my giving a draft to be paid at Liverpool. And on the 1st of February we signed the following parole: "We,

the undersigned officers and crew of the steamer *Florida*, in consideration of being released from confinement in Fort Warren, do jointly and severally pledge our sacred word of honor that we will leave the United States within ten days from date of release, and that while in the United States we will commit no hostile act," and I left the fort for the steamer *Canada*. It may be of importance to state that we were officially informed by Major Gibson, commanding the post part of the time we were there, that we could hold no communication with the Brazilian authorities.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

THOMAS K. PORTER,

First-Lieutenant, Confederate States Navy.

Correction as to the Composition of Reynolds's Brigade—Correspondence
Between Governor Porter and Major Sykes.

NASHVILLE, November 12, 1883.

Major E. T. Sykes :

DEAR SIR,—In your sketch of General Bragg's campaigns, published in the November number of the SOUTHERN HISTORICAL PAPERS, it is stated in note on page 496, in regard to the battle of Mission Ridge, that "Brigadier-General Alexander W. Reynolds's brigade of East Tennesseans were the first to give way, and could not be rallied."

I claim some familiarity with the distribution of the troops from this State, and I am positive that there was not a Tennessean in Reynolds's brigade. Will you please furnish me with your authority for the statement referred to.

Very respectfully,

JAMES D. PORTER.

COLUMBUS, MISS., November 14, 1883.

Governor James D. Porter, Nashville, Tenn. :

DEAR SIR,—Yours of the 12th instant reached me to-day, and I hasten to reply, saying that my authority for the statement in the

note on page 496, of the November number, 1883, of the SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS, that Brigadier-General Alexander W. Reynolds's Brigade of East Tennesseans were the first to give way at Mission Ridge, and could not be rallied, is the late General Bragg. In the preparation of the sketch, General Bragg furnished me many of his private papers, "preserved from the general wreck," and wrote me several letters in answer to certain questions at different times asked of him. The statement to which you called my attention was furnished in answer to one of these questions, but did not reach me until the sketch had been published in our city paper, the *Columbus Index*, then edited by our mutual friend, General J. H. Sharp. I appended the statement, and other information furnished me by General Bragg, in the form of notes, intending at some future time to elaborate more at length; but on the visit here last winter of General George D. Johnston, agent of the SOUTHERN HISTORICAL PAPERS, he heard of the papers in my possession, and asked to read them, and then made the request that I furnish them to the Society at Richmond. In the following (last) February I received from Rev. J. William Jones, of the Society, a very urgent letter requesting copies of my papers. Not having the time to make copies, I sent him the original papers by express on the 13th of February last, and heard no more from them until I saw the first installment of the "Sketch" published in the PAPERS.

The original autograph letter of General Bragg, dated February 8, 1873, containing the statement of which you complain, is quite lengthy, and written entirely with pencil; and, along with the other letters, is in the possession of the Southern Historical Society, where you can, I presume, by writing to the Secretary, obtain a copy. It was in a good state of preservation when forwarded by me.

In his report of the battle of Mission Ridge you will observe that General Bragg charges Anderson's division with first giving way and permitting the enemy to pierce our centre; but you can see by reading the letter of February 8, 1873, a copy of which is now before me, he makes the following unqualified declaration:

"I have always believed our disasters at Mission Ridge were due immediately to misconduct of a brigade of Buckner's troops from East Tennessee, commanded by Brigadier-General Alexander W. Reynolds, which first gave way and could not be rallied."

You will find in said letter many startling revelations, which I would not, for obvious reasons, allude to in the "sketch."

So far as I personally know, this brigade may or may not have

been composed of Tennesseans. It may not have had a single Tennessee regiment or company in it. I only state what was given to me as a fact by one who was presumed to know. I trust that you will consider me as desiring only to chronicle the truths of history as furnished by what I considered the most reliable source of information. And certainly the General of the army should be presumed to be the best repository of all important information touching the army under his command. At least I feel that you will relieve me of any motive or disposition to mistake important facts, when it is seen that the statements I make are backed by the authority of the General commanding. I wished only to speak of the facts as they were represented to me, "Nothing extenuate, nor set down aught in malice."

Very respectfully,

E. T. SYKES.

NASHVILLE, November 20, 1883.

Major E. T. Sykes:

DEAR SIR,—I inclose a communication from General M. J. Wright, of the War Records Office, Washington, D. C., in which he gives the organization of Reynolds's brigade from the records of the Confederate States War Department. You will see from this that there were no Tennessee troops in Reynolds's brigade. I also enclose a letter from General Frank Cheatham to the same effect; and to-day I was informed by ex-Governor John C. Brown that he had personal knowledge of the fact that Reynolds's brigade was formed of regiments from North Carolina and Virginia. My own opinion is that Reynolds's brigade was in no wise responsible for the disaster at Mission Ridge; but you will understand that my object just now is to ask you to examine the evidence I furnish and to make the correction due to Tennessee.

Very respectfully,

JAMES D. PORTER.

COLUMBUS, MISS., November 22, 1883.

Governor James D. Porter, Nashville, Tenn.:

DEAR SIR,—Your letter of the 20th instant, with inclosures, reached me to-day, and, as requested therein, I hasten to reply. From your statement, fully indorsed and supported by the statements

of Generals Cheatham and Wright, and ex-Governor John C. Brown, all of whom commanded Tennessee troops under General Bragg, I am convinced that there was no Tennessee organization in the brigade of General Alexander W. Reynolds during the Mission Ridge fight, or at any other time. The evidence furnished by you and them make it certain that Reynolds's brigade was composed of the Fifty-fourth and Sixty-third Virginia, Fifty-eighth and Sixtieth North Carolina infantry regiments; hence, the statement in the note on page 496, of the November number, 1883, of the SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS, that "Brigadier-General Alexander W. Reynolds's brigade of East Tennesseans were the first to give way, and could not be rallied," does injustice to the gallant troops from your State.

The authority for the statement in the note referred to is given in my letter to you of the 14th instant, which in justice to us both should be published along with this. It may be that General Bragg intended to convey the idea that Reynolds's brigade had just been serving in East Tennessee under Buckner, and had recently joined him; but I submit that his language, quoted in mine of the 14th instant, conveys the impression that was made use of by me.

Not wishing to do injustice, or be guilty of a seeming wrong to any one, I take pleasure in authorizing you to make such use of our correspondence as will put the question in its true light.

Yours truly,

E. T. SYKES.

The Story of the Arkansas.

By GEORGE W. GIFT.

No. I.

[We are glad to be able to put in our records the interesting "story of the Arkansas" as told by the gallant and lamented Gift, who did so much to "*make the history*" which he so admirably "*tells as it was.*"]

The 15th day of July, 1862, was a warm day, literally and figuratively, for some two hundred persons cooped up in the famous Confederate steamer *Arkansas*.

Our good ship had been gotten up under the peculiar circum-

stances of haste and incompetency, which so frequently characterized our Confederate navy. What she was designed for no man probably knows. I imagine that she was intended for a powerful iron-clad gun boat, with an iron beak for poking, and several heavy guns for shooting. But, before she had arrived at anything like a state of completion, the plan was altered, and she was made into an hermaprodite-iron-clad. That is to say (I am speaking for the benefit of those learned in naval matters), instead of finishing the ship with an ordinary rail and bulwark all round, her sides were "built on" amidships for fifty or sixty feet in length, so as to give an apology for protection to three guns in each broadside. The sides, it must be understood, were perpendicular. The ends of this "castle," or "gun-box," as Captain Brown dubbed it, were sloping or inclined, from which were thrust four more guns, two at each end. This gave us a battery of ten guns, which, by the way, were of all sizes and descriptions—to-wit: two eight-inch Columbiads; one eight-inch shell gun; two nine-inch shell guns; one smooth bore, 32 pounder, (63 cwt.,) and four rifle-guns, formerly 32-pounders, but now altered, three banded and one unbanded. Four of the carriages were mounted on railroad iron *chassis*; the six broadside guns were on carriages constructed at Canton, Miss., by parties who never saw or heard of such things before. The timber had not left the stump ten days when we received the carriages on board. But we are getting ahead too fast. The ship was built at Fort Pickering, a short distance below Memphis, by Captain John T. Shirley, as contractor, and Prime Emmerson, constructor. Her engines were built (or botched, rather,) at a foundry on Adams street, and the timber of which she was composed grew in our vicinity. The Confederate Congress, in the plenitude of their wisdom, appropriated \$125,000 to build *two rams to defend the upper Mississippi*. The *Arkansas* was the first constructed under the act, and was towed up the Yazoo after the fall of New Orleans. I will not take the reader through all the disappointments and crosses during the six or eight weeks preceding the fifteenth of July we started out with. It is sufficient that we had the craft, incomplete and rough as she was, with railroad bars on her hull and sides and ends of the "gun-box." We have a crew and an officer for every gun, and on the aforesaid morning we are steaming down the Yazoo river, bound to Mobile. Our orders were to pass Vicksburg shortly after dawn; proceed from thence down the river, destroying any stray vessels of the enemy in the road; coal-ship at New Orleans; pass Forts Jackson and St. Philip at night, and proceed to Mobile Bay

and raise the blockade! A programme as easy of accomplishment as it was superb and glorious, had not the pilot miscalculated his distance, and sunrise found us in the Yazoo river, with more than twenty ships barring our way to the goal of our hopes and ambition, instead of our being twenty miles below Vicksburg, with the batteries there driving back any foolish fellows who might think of chasing us. However, we were in for it—yes, in for one of the most desperate fights any one ship ever sustained since ships were first made.

Some time after midnight we lifted our anchor from in front of Haynes's Bluff, on the Yazoo, and steamed down the river. Just before daylight we stopped the ship and sent a boat on shore to obtain information from a plantation. Lieutenant Charles W. Read was dispatched in charge of the boat. The expedition was fruitless, as the people had taken alarm and fled on hearing a steamer in the river and a boat approaching their landing. An old negro woman alone remained to guard the house. Read made inquiry concerning the whereabouts of the people. She could not tell. "They have but just left," he insisted, "for the beds are yet warm." "Dunno 'bout dat," said the aunty, "an' if I did, I wouldn't tell." "Do you take me for a Yankee? Don't you see I wear a gray coat," said the Lieutenant. "Sartin you's a Yankee. Our folks ain't got none dem gun-boats."

Getting no satisfaction, we proceeded; and when the sun rose we were still in the Yazoo.

As it is now daylight, let me describe the scene on a man-of-war's deck, cleared for action, or at least that man-of-war, on that occasion. Many of the men had stripped off their shirts and were bare to the waists, with handkerchiefs bound round their heads, and some of the officers had removed their coats and stood in their undershirts. The decks had been thoroughly sanded to prevent slipping after the blood should become plentiful. Tourniquets were served out to division officers by the surgeons, with directions for use. The division tubs were filled with water to drink; fire buckets were in place; cutlasses and pistols strapped on; rifles loaded and bayonets fixed; spare breechings for the guns, and other implements made ready. The magazines and shell-rooms forward and aft were open, and the men inspected in their places. Before getting underway, coffee (or an apology therefor) had been served to the crew, and daylight found us a grim, determined set of fellows, grouped about our guns, anxiously waiting to get sight of the enemy.

Shortly after sunrise, the smoke from several steamers was discov-

ered by Captain Brown, who, with the First Lieutenant, Henry K. Stevens,* stood on a platform entirely exposed to the enemy's fire. This was the signal for fresh girding up, last inspections and final arrangements for battle. Lieutenant John Grimbail and myself divided the honor of commanding the eight-inch Columbiads. He fought the starboard and I the port gun. Midshipman Dabney M. Scales was his Lieutenant, and a youngster named John Wilson, of Baltimore, was mine. Lieutenant A. D. Wharton, of Nashville, came next on the starboard broadside, with Midshipman R. H. Bacot for his assistant. Lieutenant Charles W. Read, of Mississippi, had the two stern chasers, both rifles, to himself, and the remaining two guns on the port side were under command of Lieutenant Alphonse Barbot (recently died in New York). Each Lieutenant had two guns. Grimbail and myself had each a bow-chaser and a broadside gun. The two Masters, John L. Phillips and Samuel Milliken, were in charge of the two powder divisions. Stephens busied himself passing about the ship, cool and smiling, giving advice here and encouragement there. Our commander, Lieutenant Isaac Newton Brown, passed around the ship, and after making one of his sharp, pithy speeches, returned to his post with glass in hand to get the first sight of the approaching enemy. In a few moments we see *three* gunboats round a point in full view, steaming towards us gallantly and saucily, with colors streaming in the wind. The iron-clad *Carondelet*, of twelve guns, commanded by Lieutenant Walke (a renegade Virginian), was on the right. The *A. O. Tyler*, the vessel which annoyed our troops at Shiloh, commanded by Lieutenant Gwin,† my classmate, was in the centre, and the unlucky river-ram, *Queen of the West*, commanded by an army "mustang" named Hunter, was on the left. It is quite probable that they imagined we would take to our heels when we saw the odds which were against us. They were mistaken. Owing to the fact that our bow-ports were quite small, we could train our guns laterally very little; and as our head was looking to the right of the enemy's line, we were compelled to allow them to begin the action, which was quite agreeable, as we had levelled all our guns with a spirit-level the day before, marked the trunnions, and agreed that we would not fire until we were sure of hitting an enemy direct, without elevation. The gunnery of the enemy was excellent, and his rifle bolts soon began to ring on our iron front,

*Afterward killed on board steamer *Cotton*, in Bayou Teche, La.

†Killed at Haynes's Bluff the succeeding year.

digging into and warping up the bars, but not penetrating. Twice he struck near my port, and still we could not "see" him. The first blood was drawn from my division. An Irishman, with more curiosity than prudence, stuck his head out the broadside port, and was killed by a heavy rifle bolt which had missed the ship. Stevens was with me at the time; and, fearing that the sight of the mangled corpse and blood might demoralize the guns' crew, sprang forward to throw the body out of the port, and called upon the man nearest him to assist. "Oh! I can't do it, sir," the poor fellow replied, "it's my brother." The body was thrown overboard. This incident of the brother was related to me by Stevens afterwards, for by that time I had enough to do ahead. As soon as we could point straight for the enemy, with safety from grounding, the pilot steered direct for the *Tyler*, and I got the first shot, with an eight-inch shell with five-second fuse. It struck him fair and square, killing a pilot in its flight and bursting in the engine-room. She reported seventeen killed and fourteen wounded, and I think this shell did the better part of the day's work on her. Unfortunately the gun recoiled off its *chassis*, and I was out of the action for five or ten minutes. However, Grimball made up for it. He had the best gun Captain—Robert McCalla—in the ship, and a superb crew, and his gun seemed to be continually going out and recoiling in again. The broadside guns thus far were not engaged; but they were not to remain entirely idle. The "mustang," summoning courage, shot up as though he would poke us gently in our starboard ribs. Captain Brown divined his intent, and gave notice in time. The starboard battery was trained sharp forward, and as the *Queen* ranged up, Scales gave her the first shell, followed quick by Wharton and Bacot. This settled the account on that side. The Lieutenant-Colonel had business down the river, and straightway went to attend to it; that is to say, to quote Gwin, he "fled ingloriously." This left us with the *Tyler*, now getting pretty sick, and the *Carondelet* to deal with.

It was, I think, somewhere about this stage of the fight that a bolt entered the pilot-house and mortally wounded John Hodges, Mississippi pilot, and disabled Mr. Shacklett, Yazoo river pilot, and broke the forward rim of the wheel. James Brady, the remaining Mississippi pilot, took charge, however, and by his admirable judgment and coolness kept the vessel in deep water until she got into the Mississippi, where he knew what he was about. The fight had been an advance on our part; we had never slowed the engines, but stood forward as though we held such small fry in contempt. Gwin handled

and fought the *Tyler* with skill as long as there was any hope; but he finally took to his heels, badly crippled, and went after the "mustang." What Walke did in the *Carondelet*, in the first part of the engagement, I am not competent to say, as I was mounting my gun, but I think he was "hacked" quite early, and did but little. At any rate, when I came on the scene again (not more than ten minutes had elapsed from the first gun), and ran out my gun, the *Carondelet* was right ahead of us, distant about one hundred yards, and paddling down stream for dear life. Her armor had been pierced four times by Grimbail, and we were running after her to use our ram, having the advantage of speed. Opposite to me a man was standing outside on the port-sill loading the stern chaser. He was so near that I could readily have recognized him had he been an acquaintance. I pointed the Columbiad for that port and pulled the lock-string. I have seen nothing of the man or gun since. We were now using fifteen-pound charges of powder and solid shot, which latter were hastily made in Canton, and had *very* little windage; so that I think we bored the fellow through and through from end to end. It was an exceedingly good thing we had. If his stern guns were not dismounted the crews had deserted them, for they were not used after my gun came into action the second time. I think I had hit four times, and our beak was nearly up to him, when Brady discovered that he was taking to shoal water with the hope of our grounding—we drew four feet more water than she. Therefore, we sheered off, and passed so close that it would have been easy to have jumped on board. Stevens passed rapidly along the port broadside, and saw the guns depressed to their utmost, and bid us wait for a good chance and fire down through his bottom. As we lapped up alongside, and almost touching, we poured in our broadside, which went crashing and plunging through his timbers and bottom. Although his four broadside guns—one more than we had—were run out and ready, *he did not fire them*. We were running near the left or Vicksburg side of the river (we are now in what is called Old River), and, as soon as passed, we headed for the middle of the stream, which gave Read his first opportunity—and right well did he use it. His rifles "spoke" to the purpose, for the enemy *hauled down his colors*. In an instant Captain Brown announced the fact from the deck, and ordered the firing to cease; but the ship still swinging, gave Wharton and the others a chance at her with the starboard guns before it was known that he had surrendered. White flags now appeared at her ports, and the news of our victory was known all over the ship in a moment.

Talk about yelling and cheering; you should have heard it at the

moment on the deck of the *Arkansas* to have appreciated it. In fifteen minutes, without being checked in our progress, we had thrashed three of the enemy's vessels—one carrying arms as good as ours and two more guns than we, and one of the others was a famous ram, whilst the third, though of but little account, gave moral support to the others. It was glorious. For it was the first and *only* square, fair, *equal* stand-up and knock-down fight between the two navies in which the Confederates came out first best. From the beginning our ship was handled with more pluck, decision, and judgment than theirs (the *Tyler* excepted); our guns were better fought and better served. Not an officer or man doubted the result from the beginning. We went in to win, and we *won*. We now had no time to stop to secure our prize, as the enemy would be apprised of our coming and swarm in the river like bees if we did not hurry. These fellows we had beaten were but skirmishers of a main army. Consequently, we pushed down the river, and the *Carondelet* sank on a sand-bar on the right side.

I have been very explicit in regard to this battle with the *Carondelet*, inasmuch as her commander afterwards stated to Lieutenant John W. Dunnington, of the Confederate navy, that he was not pierced by a single shot from the *Arkansas* that day; that he had no men killed or wounded, and did not strike his colors. I challenge him to print his official report of the day's proceedings from the files of the Navy Department. It was carefully suppressed during the war. And as for striking his colors, that will be sworn to by a dozen men; and that he did sink can be proven by hundreds who saw steamers at work raising the vessel.

Official Reports of Actions with Federal Gunboats, Ironclads and Vessels of the U. S. Navy, During the War Between the States, by Officers of Field Artillery P. A. C. S.

No. 1.

QUARTERS "FARIES'S BATTERY," P. L. A.,
First Brigade Infantry, (Mouton's),
Forces South of Red River, Bisland Plantation,
Bayou Têche, La., November 10th, 1862.

Capt. R. C. Bond, Chief of Artillery:

SIR,—I have the honor to report that on the afternoon of the 3d November, instant, the right section of this battery, consisting of two three-inch rifled guns, Parrott pattern, commanded by First Lieut. B. F. Winchester, having taken position at Cornay's residence,

on the right and a short distance in advance of the Confederate States gunboat "J. A. Cotton" (four guns), commanding the *obstructions* at the bridge just below that place; opened fire about 4 o'clock on the four gunboats of the enemy then approaching, engaging three boats following each other in succession, for about thirty minutes, under a severe fire from their heavy guns, *at short range and unsupported*, but in battery with a section of Capt. O. J. Semmes's battery, consisting of two James Rifles (bronze twelve-pounders), under First Lieut. J. A. West. Both sections then fell back to the Bayou Teche road, in the rear of and above their first position, where after firing ten to fifteen minutes, retired in good order and returned to this camp.

The nature of the ground and cover in our out-front (guns being in battery among a number of large live oak trees) prevented the effect of all the shots being observed, it has been ascertained, however, and believed that two of the gunboats retired badly crippled, and from the cries heard on board, a number of the enemy must have been wounded.

Being the *first engagement* for this section and for most of the men, all behaved well under fire. The horses for new ones were remarkably quiet.

I have no casualties to report.

The distance fired from the first position was about 300 yards. The number of shell (fuse) fired by this section was fifty-eight.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

T. A. FARIES,

Capt. Comd'g Battery, Moulton's Brigade.

NOTES.—The following particulars of the fight from the Federals were received through the lines after this report was written:

"The U. S. S. 'Kinsman' had the brunt of the combat, she received fifty-four shot and shell in her hull and upper works; had one man killed and five wounded.

"The U. S. S. 'Estrella' received three shot; had two men killed and one mortally wounded.

"The U. S. S. 'Calhoun' was struck by eight shot or shell; received no serious damage; no casualties reported.

"The U. S. S. 'Diana' received three shell, her rudder was rendered useless, being badly shattered; she had to be towed back to Berwick's Bay."

The C. S. S. "J. A. Cotton" was armed with one thirty-two pounder, smooth bore, and two twenty-four pounders, smooth bore,

in casemate, covered with railroad iron. On her upper or hurricane deck she had one nine-pounder, rifled piece, on field carriage; her casemate extended aft sufficiently to protect her boilers and engines. She was the finest boat that had been built for the Bayou Sara route; her cabin was one of the most elegant on the Mississippi river; her engines were compound, high and low pressure. In the month of January following it became necessary to burn her to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy.

The Federal gunboat "Diana" was armed with one thirty-two pounder Parrott rifle on her open bow and one or two twelve-pounder bronze Dahlgren rifled boat howitzers. Several months after the fight of November 3d, while making a reconnoissance a few miles lower down, she was engaged by the "Valverde" battery, Captain Sayres, C. S. A. (attached to Sibley's Texas brigade), and a detachment of cavalry. After a great slaughter among her crew she was captured with nearly two hundred infantry aboard. The boilers of the "Diana" were protected by two thicknesses of wrought bar iron, four inches by one and a-quarter inches, laid flat on a wood backing, built at an angle of thirty to forty degrees. The solid shot from Captain Sayres's six-pounder bronze smooth-bore guns penetrated this wrought iron in several places, making indentations of three-quarters to one inch in depth, one six-pound solid shot passing entirely through the double iron plating into the wood backing. Distance fired by the field artillery was from one hundred and fifty to two hundred yards.

The pilot-house was protected by scantling placed upright edge-wise, arranged like a vertical, fixed Venetian blind, through the narrow open spaces of which the pilot could see in four directions and be protected from the fire of small arms. The Captain and pilot occupied the pilot-house on this occasion. The captain was killed by the side of the pilot, who jumped overboard, and, swimming to the marsh on the left bank of the Teche, made his way to Berwick's Bay and reported the loss of the boat.

The "Diana" was repaired and was posted in the centre of the Confederate line at the battle of "Bisland," April 12th and 13th, 1863. Captain O. J. Semmes, of the field artillery, was detached from his battery and placed in command of her for the occasion, fighting her with his characteristic gallantry. She was disabled by the fire of the three or four Federal gunboats in the bayou in the rear of the Federal line of battle. Later, when Major-General R. Taylor, the commander-in-chief, fell back up the bayou, the gallant Semmes, to prevent her

recovery by the enemy, after landing his crew applied the torch to her, and she blew up soon after.

The pilot who was detailed from Faries's battery for the "Diana" after she became a Confederate gunboat, and the pilot who escaped when she was captured from the Federals, *both* occupied the pilot-house of the steamer "W. S. Pike," a Bayou Sara packet, some thirteen years after the events referred to.

The United States gunboat "Diana" was captured in Bayou Teche, La., March 28, 1863. F.

(Federal Army Correspondent's Account.)

FIGHT NEAR BRASHEAR CITY.

The New Orleans *Delta* of November 6th, 1862, contains the following relative to a naval expedition which started from New Orleans, and having made the trip by sea, arrived at the pier at Berwick's Bay too late to prevent the Confederate forces under Brigadier-General Alfred Mouton from crossing, a day or two after his engagement with General Weitzel, on Bayou Lafourche, at "Texana":

"The Confederates crossed the bay to the Berwick side at the extremity of the Opelousas railroad, and marched up to a point fourteen miles above the bay, and there *obstructed* the bayou. They had destroyed the railroad bridge at Bayou Bœuf, some eight miles below Brashear City. Colonel Thomas, of the Eighth Vermont regiment, is now repairing it. From Thibodeaux to Brashear City it is twenty-nine miles. One portion of General Weitzel's corps d'armee is at Tigerville, half way between these two points, and as soon as the communications are established, he will be able to throw his forces in a few hours on any point he wishes. We know that the Bayou Teche falls into the Atchafalaya very near Berwick's Bay, and by this bayou you penetrate through all the parts of Attakapas. Opelousas, *Vermilionville*, St. Martinsville and Franklin are on its banks."

The correspondent of the *Delta* states that "the 'flotilla' arrived on the 1st of November, at night, in view of Brashear City. The steamer Kinsman drawing too much water, Lieutenant Buchanan tried to pass the steamer Estrella with his supplementary force, but the Estrella grounding, he came to the entrance of the bay and gave chase to the Confederate States steamer Hart (transport), but without catching her. The next day (2d) the Estrella got off, and arrived with the St. Mary. The day following came the steamers Calhoun and Diana. The night of our arrival we chased the gunboat Cotton;

she being of superior speed, made her escape. The same night we took the Rebel steamer A. B. Segur, a little steamboat having about the dimensions of the fancy Natchez; she is of great service to us. On the 3d of November *all the* gunboats went up the Bayou Teche and *passed the obstructions* that the Rebels had made to stop the passage. Fourteen miles from its mouth we met the Rebels. The engagement lasted *two hours*; the Rebels *dispersed*, and the Cotton disappeared.

"The Kinsman received the brunt of the engagement. She received fifty-four shots in her wood and upper works, and had one man killed and five wounded. Little John Bellins had his leg fractured, and died to-day from the effects of amputation. The Estrella received three shots; had two soldiers killed, and one man mortally wounded. The Diana received three shots; as her rudder was badly shattered, she had to be towed back to the bay.

"The Calhoun was struck eight times without serious damage. Captain Wiggins behaved nobly; the position of his vessel exposed him at once to the fire of the artillery on shore and the guns of the Cotton. He *silenced one* and answered the *other*. All the Rebel army *was there*, amounting, it is said, to from *three to four thousand men*, and, we are assured, *seventy pieces of light artillery*. We are advised to-day that they suffered greatly, and the steamer Cotton *careened*. They had made, on the right side of the bayou, a mud fort, but evacuated it before our arrival. We *tried to remove the obstructions*—without success. We will succeed when General Weitzel arrives, and will protect the banks from the sharpshooters of the enemy.

"The enemy destroyed a thousand hogsheads of sugar, a lot of molasses, and burnt ninety cars and some locomotives. The Cotton is an iron-clad, and her guns work perfectly. She *has a long 32-pounder, four 24's, and ten 6-pounder long-range guns*.* The iron covering of the Diana and Kinsman resisted perfectly *their* fire. Captain McLoefflin was——on the Calhoun with his company. He came on shore with his men and tried to get opposite the Cotton,

*The mud fort referred to—"Battery Fuselier"—was several miles above the obstructions. Four pieces of field artillery, rifled 10 and 12-pounders, and the four guns of the Cotton, *unsupported* by cavalry or infantry, composed the entire force on the Confederate side. Such exaggerated accounts of engagements during the late war has had its influence on Northern historians; and it is not surprising when a writer magnifies *four* pieces of artillery into *seventy*. They tried to remove the obstructions, *without success, after they had passed them*. F.

but this boat had left when he arrived. We will take her if she is not sunk. Yesterday (5th November) Lieutenant Buchanan returned from another trip up the Bayou Teche with the *Estrella*. He had three men killed by bullets. The *Cotton* was *there*. The Rebels placed a battery on each side of the bayou, but he succeeded in *chasing them away*. I believe the *Cotton* is casemated, for our shells *ricochet* on her. We could see clearly our shot strike her, but she fights with her bow to the front."

"Degrading Influence of Slavery"—Reply of Judge Critcher to Mr. Hoar.

In the debate on Education in the House of Representatives, Mr. Hoar, of Massachusetts, remarked that slavery in the South was not so observable in the degradation of the slave as in the depravity of the master.

Mr. Critcher, of Virginia, replied: Reminding the gentleman from Massachusetts that every signer of the Declaration of Independence, except those from his State, and perhaps one or two others, were slave-owners, he would venture to make a bold assertion; he would venture to say that he could name more eminent men from the parish of his residence, than the gentleman could name from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. He would proceed to name them, and yield the floor to the gentleman to match them if he could. On one side of his estate is Wakefield, the birth-place of Washington. On the other side is Stratford, the residence of Light Horse Harry Lee, of glorious Revolutionary memory. Adjoining Stratford is Chantilly, the residence of Richard Henry Lee, the mover of the Declaration of Independence, and the Cicero of the American Revolution. There lived Francis Lightfoot Lee, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence. Charles Lee, at one time Washington's Attorney-General; and Arthur Lee, the accomplished negotiator of the treaty of commerce and alliance between the Colonies and France in 1777. Returning, as said before, you come first to the birth-place of Washington; another hour's drive will bring you to the birth-place of Monroe; another hour's drive to the birth-place of Madison, and if the gentleman supposes that the present generation is unworthy of their illustrious ancestors, he has but to stand on the same estate to see the massive chimneys of the baronial mansion that witnessed the birth of Robert E. Lee. These are some of the eminent men from the parish of his residence, and he yielded the floor, that the gentleman might match them, if he could, from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Agreement between the United States Government and South Carolina as to
"Preserving the Status" of the Forts at Charleston.

*Letter from GENERAL E. CAPERS and Statement of EX-GOVERNOR ORR, of
South Carolina.*

The following statement was made to me by Governor James L. Orr at the request of General T. W. Crawford, U. S. A.

Governor Orr dictated the statement and I wrote it down.

General Crawford had written to ask me if I could procure from Governor Orr any information respecting the reputed agreement between the United States Government and the State of South Carolina in reference to a fixed status of the forts in Charleston harbor at the time of the State's secession.

Governor Orr was at the time of making the statement Judge of the Circuit Court and holding court in Greenville, S. C.

ELLISON CAPERS.

STATEMENT OF JAMES L. ORR.

I retired from Congress on the 4th of March, 1859, hence was not present as a member when the arrangement was made between Mr. Buchanan and the South Carolina delegation with reference to the forts in Charleston harbor, early in December, 1860.

Immediately after the passage of the ordinance of secession by the South Carolina Convention that body elected Messrs. Barnwell, Adams and Orr commissioners to go to Washington to arrange for a peaceable secession of the State, and for an arrangement by which the State should pay her proportion of the public debt of the United States and receive likewise her proportion of all the public property.

Before the Commission left Charleston, where the Convention was in session, Mr. Miles, one of the delegates, and also a member of Congress, announced to the Convention the arrangement which had been made between Mr. Buchanan and the delegation, securing a fixed military status in the harbor. He stated, and produced a memorandum to the effect, that the authorities of South Carolina should make no demonstration upon the forts or troops of the United States until notice should be given the President; and he, on his part, stipulated that the garrison in Charleston harbor should not be reinforced, or the status of the situation changed without notice to the authorities of South Carolina.

The Commissioners went on to Washington and opened negotiations with the President.

A day or two after they reached there they received a telegram (the first that reached the city) that Major Anderson had in the night-time evacuated Fort Moultrie, and occupied Fort Sumter.

This movement was in direct violation of the stipulations before referred to. A few moments afterwards General Floyd, the Secretary of War, called to pay his respects to the Commissioners.

He was handed immediately the telegram, and when he read it he expressed the utmost surprise and indignation at the movement of Major Anderson.

He said that it was entirely voluntary on the part of Major Anderson; that he had received no orders from him to take any such step; that he was aware of the arrangement made between the President and the South Carolina delegation with reference to the status of the troops and forts in Charleston harbor; that it was a violation of that arrangement; and that he would see the President immediately and order Major Anderson to return with his forces to Fort Moultrie.

He left the commissioners, saying that he would see the President immediately. The commissioners ascertained that day, or the next, that the President hesitated about ordering Anderson to reoccupy Moultrie, and they proposed to fix an hour to call upon the President with reference to this matter. He informed them that he could not receive them in their official capacity, but would give them an audience at the hour designated as leading and distinguished citizens of South Carolina.

The commissioners called at the hour appointed, and had a long and earnest interview with the President, reaching nearly two hours in length. Mr. Barnwell was the chairman of the commission. He brought to the attention of the President the arrangement which had been made early in December between his Excellency and the South Carolina delegation; that it had been observed in good faith by the people of South Carolina, who could at any time after the arrangement was made, up to the night when Major Anderson removed to Sumter, have occupied Fort Sumter, and captured Moultrie with all of its command; that the removal of Major Anderson violated that agreement on the part of the Government of the United States; and that the faith of the President and Government had been thereby forfeited.

The President made various excuses why he should be allowed time to decide the question, whether Anderson should be ordered back to Moultrie and the former status restored. Mr. Barnwell pressed him with great zeal and earnestness to issue the order at once. Mr.

Buchanan still hesitated, and Mr. Barnwell said to him at least three times during the interview: "But, Mr. President, your personal honor is involved in this matter; the faith you pledged has been violated, and your personal honor requires you to issue the order." Mr. Barnwell pressed him so hard upon this point, that the President said: "You must give me time to consider; this is a grave question."

Mr. Barnwell repeated to him for the third time: "But, Mr. President, your personal honor is involved in this arrangement." Whereupon, Mr. Buchanan, with great earnestness, said: "Mr. Barnwell, you are pressing me too importunately—you don't give me time to consider—you don't give me time to say my prayers; I always say my prayers when required to act upon any great state affair."

The interview terminated without getting an order to restore the status of the troops in Charleston harbor.

The commissioners the next day addressed him a communication more plain than diplomatic, in which they reviewed very fully his pledges not to allow any change in the status of the forts in Charleston harbor. After reading their communication, he returned it to them with an endorsement: The communication was not respectful; that he would not receive it.

General Floyd declared when he first heard of Anderson's removal that if the President did not order him back to Moultrie that he would resign his position as Secretary of War, and he did resign before the commission left Washington.

The circumstances which transpired during the eventful week that the commission was in Washington satisfied us that General Floyd never gave Major Anderson any orders to remove, and that if such orders were communicated to him in Floyd's name, or from the War Department, such orders were issued clandestinely and without General Floyd's knowledge. * * * * *

There was no formal vote passed in the Convention with reference to the course that was to be pursued by the State towards the forts in Charleston harbor as to occupying them. After the communication already referred to, by Mr. Miles to the Convention, it was tacitly endorsed; many members of the Convention believed that the commissioners to Washington would be able to negotiate amicable terms of separation between South Carolina and the United States. It was supposed that such negotiations might occupy several weeks, and not until the commissioners reported a failure in the purposes of the mission did the Governor or any member of the Convention con-

template armed or other violence against the troops or forts of the United States in Charleston harbor.

Mr. Buchanan, in his last communication to the commissioners, states that he never contemplated for a single moment issuing an order requiring Anderson to return to Fort Moultrie. During the two or three days when that matter was under consideration and discussion several of the Southern Senators waited upon the President and urged him to issue the order; and without perhaps making any positive pledge that he would do so, his conversation and promises left the impression upon the minds of many of them that the order would be issued.

Messrs. Hunter, of Virginia, Toombs, of Georgia, Mallory and Yulee, Davis, Slidell and Benjamin are among those who conferred with the President, and most of them after such conference were left with the impression that Anderson would be ordered back by the President.

Mansion House, Greenville, S. C., September 19, 1871.

The above is an accurate copy of the original statement as I took it down when given to me by Governor Orr. I sent a copy to General T. W. Crawford, and have his letter acknowledging its receipt.

ELLISON CAPERS.

Christ Church Rectory, Greenville, November 20, 1883.

Battle of Secessionville.

REPORT OF COLONEL JOHNSON HAYGOOD.

[We are under many obligations to the gallant soldier and distinguished citizen, Governor Johnson Haygood, of South Carolina, for the use of a number of original papers, which should have been copied and published ere this, but for the pressure upon our time. We give now the first instalment, to be followed by others.]

**HEADQUARTERS ADVANCED FORCES,
JAMES ISLAND, June 18th, 1862.**

CAPTAIN,—I am required to report the operations of the troops under my command on the 16th instant.

Some days previously I had had the honor to be placed in command of a corps composed of the First and Twenty-fourth South

Carolina, the entire battalion, and McEnery's Louisiana battalion, to which were assigned the duties of the advanced guard.

The force at Secessionville, however, continued to keep out in front of that position its own outposts, which were not under my command, and made no direct report to me. This has since been changed. On the nights of the 15th and 16th the troops on the outposts of duty under my command consisted of seven (7) companies of Stevens's Twenty-fourth South Carolina Regiment, six (6) companies of Hagood's First South Carolina, and one company of the Forty-seventh Georgia, all under the immediate charge of Colonel Stevens. They covered the whole front of our lines from the Secessionville road to New Town cut. The picket from Secessionville covered the space from the Secessionville road to the marsh on the left of our lines. At 4:30 A. M., on the 16th instant, I received a dispatch from Colonel Stevens, that the Secessionville pickets had been driven in, and that the enemy were advancing in force upon that position. I immediately ordered under arms that portion of the First Regiment not on picket, and Colonel Simonton's Eutaw battalion, directing them to proceed down the Battery Island road, in front of our intrenchments, to the flank of the enemy's advance: and ordered Colonel McEnery's Louisiana battalion to proceed in rear by the bridge to Secessionville—delivering these orders in person.

Proceeding in advance down the Battery Island road, I ordered forward one of the two six pounders of Boyce's battery, stationed at the crossing of the Fort Johnson road, and arriving at the scene of action, found the enemy making their second advance upon the post at Secessionville. A thicket of felled trees ran parallel with their line of advance and about four hundred yards west of it, on the edge of which next to the enemy, Colonel Stevens had deployed about one hundred men, who had been on picket duty near that point. These men were from the companies of Captains Tompkins, Pearson, Lieutenant Hammoter, commanding, and Gooding, Lieutenant Beckham, commanding, of the 24th Regiment, S. C. The Battery Island road was so obstructed, as to be impassible by troops or vehicles, ran between this felled thicket and a dense wood stretching towards Grimball's on the Stono. Simonton's battalion coming up was placed behind the felled thicket in line of battle, its right resting near the Battery Island road, and the detachment of the First regiment was placed in reserve in the Battery Island road, throwing out a strong line of skirmishers towards the Stono (which runs nearly parallel with this road), to guard against an advance from that point. Boyce's piece under Lieutenant Jeter was

placed on Simonton's left, at the extremity of the felled thicket.

The object of this disposition was chiefly defensive, as a general advance upon our lines seemed imminent. Three regiments of infantry advanced in front of us, but beyond musket-range, to attack the west flank of the work at Secessionville, being supported by a battery of field artillery, near the Battery Island road, in front of and beyond Simonton's right. Lieutenant Jeter was directed to open upon these regiments, which he did with effect. I immediately sent to the General Commanding, asking to be supported in making an attack upon the rear and flank of these regiments. When the permission to attack and the assurance of support arrived the enemy had retreated. In the meanwhile the fire of Jeter's piece drew upon us a heavy fire from the enemy's field battery, which, from the sheltered position of our troops, did but little damage, and four companies of the Third Rhode Island Regiment were sent in as skirmishers to seize the felled woods and capture the piece. Stevens's skirmishers gallantly repulsed them. A portion of the enemy, however, penetrated to Simonton's line of battle, and one of his companies was for a few moments engaged in driving them back. A few casualties in other portions of his line occurred from the random fire of the enemy engaged with our skirmishers, and one man in the detachment from the First Regiment was wounded in the same way.

The enemy in retreating were seen carrying off their wounded. Six men were left dead in front of our skirmishers, twelve were left dead farther on towards Secessionville, where the three regiments spoken of were fired upon by Lieutenant Jeter, making their loss in this part of the field eighteen killed. Eleven prisoners were captured, of whom eight were wounded. Sixty-eight small arms, mostly Enfield rifles were abandoned by them and recovered by this command. Our loss was eight killed, twenty-two wounded, two missing.

Appended is a detailed list of casualties.

I have the honor to be

Very respectfully,

JOHNSON HAGOOD,

Colonel 1st S. C. V., Commanding Advanced Forces.

Capt. Mallory P. King, A. A. G., James Island.

HEADQUARTERS JAMES ISLAND,

June 22, 1862.

Colonel Hagood, Commanding Advanced Line, East Division, James Island:

COLONEL,—In the absence of General Evans, first in command on the 16th instant, allow me to thank you for your distinguished services on that day, and through you to thank Colonel Stevens, Colonel Simonton and the other gallant officers and men under your command, for their noble and gallant service at that time. Please make known my views to your command.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

WM. DUNCAN SMITH,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

Contributions to the History of the Confederate Ordnance Department.

[We have long desired to secure a series of papers on Confederate Ordnance—the great obstacles with which our Government had to contend, the able and efficient means employed to overcome these obstacles, and the splendid results achieved in the face of difficulties which would have appalled men of less nerve and defeated officers of less skill.

Our gallant and accomplished friend, General I. M. St. John, who was so long the chief of the Nitre and Mining Bureau, had promised to secure us such a series of papers from those who were in position to know the facts, and was at work on it with his accustomed energy when death deprived us of his invaluable services.

General Gorgas, the able chief of the Department, had promised to make his contribution, when his lamented death ended a long and useful career.

We count ourselves, therefore, especially fortunate that the following paper from General Gorgas has been preserved—that other interesting and valuable papers have been promised—and that Colonel William Allan, the accomplished Chief of Ordnance of the old Second Corps Army Northern Virginia, has kindly consented to edit them for us.]

INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY COLONEL WILLIAM ALLAN.

McDONOUGH, MD., January, 1884.

Probably no better illustration of the difficulties which lay in the way of organizing and supplying the large armies kept in the field by the Confederate Government, and of the skill and energy by which these difficulties were surmounted, is to be found than in the history of the Confederate Ordnance Department. A full account of its operations would constitute one of the most creditable and interesting chapters in the history of the Confederacy. Much of the data for such a narrative has perished, and what remains is widely scattered. It has been proposed to save what is left by means of a series of "Contributions to the History of the Confederate States Ordnance Department," to consist of such facts as surviving officers of that Department may be able to furnish.

It is greatly to be regretted that General Gorgas, to whose energy, zeal, and executive ability, more than to any other one cause, the remarkable efficiency of the Ordnance Department was due, did not prepare a full narrative of its operations. His lamented death prevented this, and deprives us of the further service he might thus have added to a most honorable and useful career. Among his papers were found, however, the following most valuable historical memoranda. Mrs. Gorgas has kindly consented to the publication of this paper, with the statement that these notes were informal, and not intended by General Gorgas for publication in their present unfinished shape.

We believe that even in its present shape this paper contains the best and most reliable sketch of the work of the Confederate Ordnance Department that is now attainable. It is offered as the first of the "Contributions," with the hope and expectation that subsequent papers may supplement and fill out subjects too briefly touched upon by General Gorgas.

W. ALLAN.

PAPER I.

[Found among the papers of the late General Josiah Gorgas, Chief of Ordnance of the Confederate States.]

Notes on the Ordnance Department of the Confederate Government.

SMALL ARMS.

At the formation of the government, or at the beginning of the war, the arms at command were distributed as follows, as nearly as I can recollect:

	<i>Rifles.</i>	<i>Muskets.</i>
At Richmond, Va. (about).....	4,000
Fayetteville Arsenal, North Carolina (about)..	2,000	25,000
Charleston Arsenal, South Carolina (about)...	2,000	20,000
Augusta Arsenal, Georgia (about).....	3,000	28,000
Mount Vernon Arsenal, Alabama.....	2,000	20,000
Baton Rouge Arsenal, Louisiana.....	2,000	27,000
	<hr/> 15,000	<hr/> 120,000

There were at Richmond about 60,000 old, worthless flint muskets, and at Baton Rouge about 10,000 old Hall's rifles and carbines.

Besides the foregoing, there were at Little Rock, Ark., a few thousand stands, and some few at the Texas arsenals, increasing the aggregate of serviceable arms to, say, 143,000. To these must be added the arms owned by the several States and by military organizations throughout the country, giving, say, 150,000 in all for the use of the armies of the Confederacy. The rifles were of the calibre 54, known as Mississippi rifles, except those at Richmond, taken from Harper's Ferry, which were calibre 58; the muskets were the old flint-lock, calibre 69, altered to percussion. Of sabres there were a few boxes at each arsenal, and some short artillery swords. A few hundred holster pistols were scattered here and there. There were no revolvers.

AMMUNITION, POWDER AND LEAD.

There was little ammunition of any kind, or powder, at the arsenals in the South, and that little relics of the Mexican war, stored principally at Baton Rouge and Mount Vernon arsenals. I doubt whether there were a million rounds of small-arm cartridges in the Confederacy. Lead there was none in store. Of powder the chief supply was that captured at Norfolk, though there was a small quantity at each of the Southern arsenals, say 60,000 pounds in all, chiefly old cannon powder. The stock of percussion caps could not have exceeded one-quarter of a million.

ARTILLERY.

There were no batteries of serviceable field artillery at any of the Southern arsenals. A few old iron guns, mounted on Gribeaural carriages, fabricated about the time of the war of 1812, composed nearly the entire park which the Confederate States fell heir to. There were

some serviceable batteries belonging to the States, and some which belonged to volunteer companies. There were neither harness, saddles, bridles, blankets, nor other artillery or cavalry equipments.

Thus to furnish 150,000 men on both sides of the Mississippi, on say the 1st of May, 1861, there were on hand no infantry accoutrements, no cavalry arms or equipments—no artillery and, above all, no ammunition; nothing save small arms, and these almost wholly smooth-bore, altered from flint to percussion. Let us see what means we had for producing these supplies.

ARSENALS, WORKSHOPS, FOUNDRIES, ETC.

Within the limits of the Confederate States, there were no arsenals at which any of the material of war was constructed. No arsenal, except that at Fayetteville, N. C., had a single machine above a foot-lathe. Such arsenals as there were, had been used only as depots. All the work of preparation of material had been carried on at the North; not an arm,* not a gun, not a gun carriage, and except during the Mexican war—scarcely a round of ammunition had, for fifty years, been prepared in the Confederate States. There were consequently no workmen, or very few of them, skilled in these arts. No powder, save perhaps for blasting, had been made at the South; and there was no saltpetre in store at any point; it was stored wholly at the North. There was no lead nor any mines of it, except on the Northern limit of the Confederacy, in Virginia, and the situation of that made its product precarious. Only one cannon foundry existed: at Richmond. Copper, so necessary for field artillery and for percussion caps, was just being produced in East Tennessee. There was no rolling mill for bar iron south of Richmond; and but few blast furnaces, and these small, and with trifling exceptions in the border States of Virginia and Tennessee.

Such were the supplies and such the situation when I took charge of the Ordnance Department on the 8th of April, 1861.

The first thing to be attended to was the supply of powder. Large orders had been sent to the North, both by the Confederate Government and some of the States, and these were being rapidly filled at the date of the attack on Fort Sumter. The entire product of one large Northern mill was being received at a Southern port. Of course all the ports were soon sealed to such importations from the North. Attention was at once turned to the production of nitre in North

*See note on transfer of arms to the South.

Alabama and in Tennessee—in the latter State under the energetic supervision of its Ordnance Department. An adequate supply of sulphur was found in New Orleans, where large quantities were in store to be used in sugar-refining. The entire stock was secured, amounting to some four or five hundred tons.

The erection of a large powder-mill was early pressed by President Davis, and about the middle of June, 1861, he directed me to detail an officer to select a site and begin the work. The day after this order was given Colonel G. W. Rains, a graduate of West Point, in every way qualified for this service, arrived in Richmond, through the blockade, and at once set out under written instructions from me to carry out the President's wishes. He, however, went first to East Tennessee to supervise and systematize the operations of two small private mills, which were then at work for the State of Tennessee.

Thus, in respect to powder and our means of making it, we had, perhaps, at this time (June 1st, 1861,) 250,000 pounds, chiefly cannon, at Norfolk and in Georgia, and as much more nitre (mainly imported by the State of Georgia). We had no powder-mills, except the two rude ones just referred to, and no experience in making powder or in getting nitre. All had to be learned.

As to a further supply of arms, steps had been taken by the President to import these and other ordnance stores from Europe; and Major Caleb Huse, a graduate of West Point, and at that moment professor in the University of Alabama, was selected to go abroad and secure them. He left Montgomery under instructions early in April, with a credit of £10,000 (!) from Mr. Memminger. The appointment proved a happy one; for he succeeded, with a very little money, in buying a good supply, and in running the Ordnance Department into debt for nearly half a million sterling—the very best proof of his fitness for his place, and of a financial ability which supplemented the narrowness of Mr. Memminger's purse.

Before this, and immediately upon the formation of the Confederate Government, Admiral Semmes had been sent to the North by President Davis as purchasing agent of arms and other ordnance stores, and succeeded in making contracts for, and purchases of, powder, percussion caps, cap machinery (never delivered), revolvers, &c. He also procured drawings for a bullet-pressing machine, and other valuable information.

The sets of machinery for making the rifle with sword bayonet, and the rifle-musket model of 1855, had been seized at Harper's Ferry by the State of Virginia. That for the rifle-musket was being

transferred by the State to her ancient armory at Richmond, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Burton, an officer in the service of Virginia, whose experience in the armories of the United States and in the erection of the works at Enfield, near London, qualified him above all for the work. The other set of machines was sent to Fayetteville, N. C., by consent of the State of Virginia, to be there re-erected, as there was at that point an arsenal with steam power, and some good buildings, which had heretofore never been put to any use. These two sets of machinery—capable, if worked with but one set of hands to each, of producing 2,000 to 2,500 stands per month in all—were the only prospective resources at home. With additional workmen, and some extension of the machinery, much larger results could be obtained. But the workmen were not to be had. As it was, it would take many months to put it in working order. Parts were missing, and some injury done in the hasty transfer (partly under fire*) from Harper's Ferry. There were no private armories at the South; nor was there any inducement, prior to the war, to turn capital in that direction. Thus, the class of skilled operatives needed were unknown to this region. In New Orleans the Brothers Cook were embarking in the business of making small arms, assisted by the purses and encouraged by the sympathy of patriotic citizens.

In *field artillery* the production was confined almost entirely to the Tredegar Works, in Richmond. Some castings were made in New Orleans, and foundries were rapidly acquiring the necessary experience to produce good bronze castings. The Ordnance Department of Tennessee was also turning its attention to the manufacture of field and siege artillery at Nashville. At Rome, Ga., a foundry—Noble & Son—was induced to undertake the casting of three-inch rifles, after drawings furnished at Montgomery; but the progress made was necessarily slow. The State of Virginia possessed a number of old four-pounder iron guns, which were reamed out to get a good bore,

*The saving of this machinery from the flames, was due to the heroic conduct of the operatives themselves, headed by Mr. Ball, the master armorer, who clung to his machinery, and by the greatest efforts, continued often under fire, saved almost the entire "plant." The names of Mr. Copeland and Major W. S. Downer are also mentioned in this connection. The older brother, Frederick, was a most competent mechanic, and a man of decided administrative ability. He was almost the only one who succeeded in producing a good service arm. He was finally killed in the trenches at Savannah, fighting with a command composed of his own operatives.

and were rifled with three grooves, after the manner of Parrott. The army in observation at Harper's Ferry, and that at Manassas, were supplied with old batteries of six-pounder guns and twelve-pounder Howitzers. A few Parrott guns purchased by the State of Virginia were with Magruder at Big Bethel.

For the ammunition and equipments required for the infantry and artillery a good laboratory and shops had been established at Richmond by the State, but none of the Southern arsenals were yet in a condition to do much work. The arsenal at Augusta, Ga., was directed to organize for the preparation of ammunition and the making of knapsacks, of which there were none wherewith to equip the troops now daily taking the field. The arsenal at Charleston and the depot at Savannah were occupied chiefly with local work. The arsenal at Baton Rouge was rapidly getting under way; and that at Mt. Vernon, Ala., was also being prepared for work. None of them had had facilities for the work usually done at an arsenal. Fayetteville, N. C. was in the hands of that State, and was occupied chiefly in repairing some arms, and in making up a small amount of small arm ammunition. Little artillery ammunition was being made up, except for local purposes, save at Richmond.

Such was the general condition of supplies when the Government, quitting Montgomery, established itself at Richmond.

PROGRESS OF MANUFACTURE.

Colonel Rains, in the course of the Summer of 1861, established a refinery of saltpetre at or near Nashville, and to this point chiefly were sent the nitre, obtained from the State of Georgia, and that derived from caves in East and Middle Tennessee. He supplied the two powder mills in that State with nitre, properly refined, and good powder was thus produced. A small portion of the Georgia nitre was sent to two small mills in South Carolina,—at Pendleton and Walhalla—and a powder produced, inferior at first, but afterwards improved. The State of North Carolina established a mill near Raleigh, under contract with certain parties to whom the State was to furnish the nitre, of which a great part was derived from caves in Georgia. A stamping mill was also put up near New Orleans, and powder produced before the fall of the city. Small quantities of powder were also received through the blockade from Wilmington to Galveston, some of it of very inferior quality. The great quantity of artillery placed in position from the Potomac to the Rio Grande, re-

quired a vast supply of powder (there was no immediate want of projectiles) to furnish even the scant allowance of fifty rounds to each gun. I think we may safely estimate that on the 1st of January, 1862, there were 1,500 sea coast guns of various calibres in position, from Evansport on the Potomac to Fort Brown on the Rio Grande. If we average their calibre at thirty-two pounders, and the charge at five pounds, it will at forty rounds per gun, give us 600,000 pounds of powder for these. The field-artillery—say 300 guns—with 200 rounds to the piece, would require, say 125,000 pounds, and the small arm cartridges, 10,000,000, would consume 125,000 pounds more—making in all 850,000 pounds. If we deduct 250,000 pounds, supposed to be on hand, in various shapes, at the beginning of the war, we have an increment of 600,000 pounds. Of this, perhaps 200,000 pounds had been made at the Tennessee and other mills, leaving 400,000 to have been supplied through the blockade, and before the commencement of actual hostilities.

The site of the Government Powder-Mills was fixed at Augusta, Georgia, on the report of Colonel Rains, and progress was made on the work in this year. There were two large buildings, in the Norman (castellated) style of architecture; one contained the refinery and store-rooms—the other being the mills, twelve in number. They were arranged in the best way on the canal which supplied water-power to Augusta. This canal served as the means of transport for the material from point to point of its manufacture, though the mills were driven by steam. All the machinery, including the very heavy rollers, was made in the Confederate States. The various qualities of powder purchased, captured and produced were sources of irregularity in the ranges of our artillery and small arms—unavoidably so of course. We were only too glad to take any sort of powder; and we bought some brought into Florida, the best range of which scarcely exceeded one hundred and sixty yards with the *eprouvette*.

Contracts were made abroad for the delivery of *nitre* through the blockade, and for producing it at home from caves. The amount of the latter delivered by contracts was considerable—chiefly in Tennessee.

The consumption of *lead* was in part met by the Virginia lead mines (Wytheville), the yield from which was from 100,000 to 150,000 pounds per month. A laboratory for the smelting of other ores, from the Silver Hill mines, North Carolina, and Jonesboro, East Tennessee, was put up at Petersburg, under the direction of Dr. Piggott, of Baltimore. It was very well constructed; was capable of smelting a good many thousand pounds per day, and was in operation before

midsummer of 1862. Mines were opened on account of Government in East Tennessee, near the State line of Virginia. They were never valuable, and were soon abandoned. Lead was collected in considerable quantities throughout the country by the laborious exertions of agents employed for this purpose. The battle-field of Bull Run was fully gleaned, and much lead collected.

By the close of 1861 the following arsenals and depots were at work, having been supplied with some machinery and facilities, and were producing the various munitions and equipments required: Augusta, Ga.; Charleston, S. C.; Fayetteville, N. C.; Richmond, Va.; Savannah, Ga.; Nashville, Tenn.; Memphis, Tenn.; Mount Vernon, Ala.; Baton Rouge, La.; Montgomery, Ala.; Little Rock, Ark.; and San Antonio, Texas—altogether eight arsenals and four depots. It would, of course, have been better, had it been practicable, to have condensed our work and to have had fewer places of manufacture; but the country was deficient in the transportation which would have been required to place the raw material at a few arsenals. In this way only could we avail ourselves of local resources, both of labor and material. Thus by the close of 1861 a good deal had been done in the way of organization to produce the material of war needed by an army, as far as our means permitted. But our troops were still very poorly armed and equipped. The old smooth-bore musket was still the principal weapon of the infantry; the artillery had the six-pounder gun and twelve-pounder howitzer chiefly; and the cavalry were armed with anything they could get—sabres, horse-pistols, revolvers, Sharp's carbines, musketoons, short Enfield rifles, Hale's carbines (a wretched apology), muskets cut off, etc., etc. Equipments were in many cases made of stout domestic, stitched in triple folds and covered with paint or rubber, varnished.

But poor as were our arms, we had not enough of these to equip the troops which were pressing to the front in July and August, 1861. In the winter of 1861-'2, while McClellan was preparing his great army near Alexandria, we resorted to the making of *pikes* for the infantry and lances for the cavalry; many thousands of the former were made at the various arsenals, but were little used. No access of enthusiasm could induce our people to rush to the field armed with *pikes*. I remember a formidable weapon, which was invented at this time, in the shape of a stout wooden sheath containing a two-edged straight sword some two feet long. The sheath or truncheon could be levelled, and the sword, liberated from the compression of a strong spring by touching a trigger, leaped out with sufficient force to transfix an opponent.

About December, 1861, arms began to come in through the purchases of Major Huse, and we had a good many Enfield rifles in the hands of our troops at Shiloh, which were received in time for use there through the blockade. Major Huse had found the market pretty well cleaned of arms by the late war in Europe, but he had succeeded in making contracts with private manufacturers, of which these arms were the result.

I will not attempt to *trace* the development of our work in its order, as I at first intended, but will note simply what I can recollect, paying some attention to the succession of events.

The winter of 1861-'2 was the darkest period of my department. Powder was called for on every hand—Bragg, at Pensacola, for his big ten-inch Columbiads; Lovell, at New Orleans, for his extended defences, and especially for his inadequate artillery at Forts Jackson and St. Phillips; Polk, at Columbus, Kentucky; Johnston, for his numerous batteries on the Potomac; Magruder, at Yorktown. All these were deemed most important points. Then came Wilmington, Georgetown, Port Royal, and Fernandina. Not a few of these places sent representatives to press their claims—Mr. Yulee from Fernandina, and Colonel Gonzales from Charleston. Heavy guns, too, were called for in all directions—the largest guns for the smallest places.

The abandonment of the line of the Potomac, and of the upper Mississippi from Columbus to Memphis; the evacuation of the works below Pensacola, and of Yorktown, somewhat relieved us from the pressure for heavy artillery; and after the powder-mills at Augusta went into operation in the fall of 1862, we had little trouble in supplying ammunition.

To obtain the iron needed for cannon and projectiles, it became necessary to stimulate its production in Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama. To this end, contracts were made with iron-masters in these States on liberal terms, and advances of money made to them, to be refunded in products. These contracts were difficult to arrange, as so much had to be done for the contractor. He must have details from the army and the privilege of transport of provisions and other supplies over the railroads. And then the question of the currency was a continually recurring problem. Mr. Benjamin, who succeeded Mr. Walker in the War Department, gave me great assistance in the matter of making contracts, and seemed quite at home in arranging these details. His power of work was amazing to me; and he appeared as fresh at 12 o'clock at night, after a hard day's work, as he had been at 9 o'clock in the morning.

About May, 1862, finding that the production of nitre and of iron must be systematically pursued, and to this end thoroughly organized, I sought for the right person to place in charge of this vital duty. My choice fell on Colonel I. M. St. John (afterwards Commissary-General of Subsistence), and was eminently fortunate. He had the gift of organization, and I placed him in charge of the whole subject of producing nitre from caves and from other sources, and of the formation of nitre beds, which had already been begun in Richmond. Under his supervision beds were instituted at Columbia S. C., Charleston, Savannah, Augusta, Mobile, Selma, and various other points. We never extracted nitre from these beds, except for trial; but they were carefully attended to, enriched and extended, and were becoming quite valuable. At the close of 1864 we had, according to General St. John, 2,800,000 cubic feet of earth collected and in various stages of nitrification, of which a large proportion was prepared to yield one and a half pounds of nitre per foot of earth, including all the nitre-beds from Richmond to Florida.

Through Colonel St. John, the whole nitre-bearing area of country was laid off into districts; each district in charge of an officer, who made his monthly reports to the office at Richmond. These officers procured details of workmen, generally from those subject to military duty in the mountain regions where disaffection existed, and carried on extended works in their several districts. In this way we brought up the nitre production, in the course of a year, to something like half our total consumption of nitre. It was a rude, wild sort of service; and the officers in charge of these districts, especially in East Tennessee, North Carolina, and North Alabama, had to show much firmness in their dealings with the turbulent people among whom, and by whose aid, they worked. It is a curious fact that the district on which we could rely for the most constant yield of nitre, having its headquarters at Greensboro', N. C., had no nitre-caves in it. The nitre was produced by the lixiviation of nitrous earth dug from under old houses, barns, &c.

The nitre production thus organized, there was added to the Nitre Bureau the duty of supervising the production of iron, lead, copper, and, in fine, all the minerals which needed development, including the making of sulphuric and nitric acids; which latter we had to manufacture to insure a supply of fulminate of mercury for our percussion caps. To give an idea of the extent of the duty thus performed: Colonel Morton, Chief of the Nitre and Mining Bureau, after the transfer of General St. John, writes: "We were aiding and managing some twenty to thirty furnaces, with an annual yield of 50,000 tons

or more of pig metal. We had erected lead and copper smelting furnaces [at Petersburg, before referred to] with a capacity sufficient for all our wants, and had succeeded in smelting zinc of good quality at the same place." The Chemical Works were placed at Charlotte, N. C., where a pretty large leaden chamber for sulphuric acid was put up. Our chief supply of chemicals continued to come, however, from abroad, through the blockade, and these works, as well as our nitraries, were as much preparation against the day when the blockade might seal all foreign supply, as for present use. These constituted our reserves, for final conflict.

We had not omitted to have a pretty thorough, though general exploration of the mountain regions from Virginia to Alabama, with the hope of finding new deposits of lead. One of the earliest of these searches was made by Dr. Maupin, of the University of Virginia. No favorable results came from it. I remember an anecdote he told touching one of his researches. An old settler showed the Doctor a small lump of lead which he had extracted from ore like some he had in his possession. There was the lead and here was the ore, but it was not an ore of lead. The Doctor cross-examined: "Did he smelt it himself?" "Yes." "What in?" "An iron ladle," such as is used for running lead balls. "Was there nothing in the ladle but this sort of ore?" "No, nothing." "Nothing at all? No addition—no flux?" "No, nothing but a little handful of common shot, thrown in to make it melt more easy!"

Much of the nitre region was close to the lines of the enemy, and here and there along its great extent became debatable ground. Not seldom the whole working force had to be suddenly withdrawn on the approach of the enemy, the "plant" hurried off, to be again returned and work resumed when the enemy had retired. Much of the work, too, lay in "Union" districts, where our cause was unpopular and where obstacles of all kinds had to be encountered and overcome. It was no holiday duty, this nitre digging, although the service was a good deal decried by such as knew nothing of its nature.

MANUFACTURE OF INFANTRY, ARTILLERY AND CAVALRY EQUIPMENTS.

In equipping the armies first sent into the field the supply of these accessories was amazingly scant; and these deficiencies were felt more keenly, perhaps than the more important want of arms. We had arms, such as they were, for over 100,000 men; but we had no accoutrements nor equipments; and these had to be extemporized

in a great measure. In time, knapsacks were little thought of by the troops and we at last contented ourselves with supplying haversacks, which the women (Heaven reward their labors) could make, and for which we could get cotton cloth. But cartridge boxes we *must* have; and as leather was also needed for artillery harness and for cavalry saddles, we had to divide the stock of leather the country could produce, among these much needed articles. But soldier's shoes were even more needed than some of these; so that as all could not be fully provided, a scale of preference was established. Shoes and cartridge boxes were most needed, and then saddles and bridles. The President, whose practical sagacity was rarely at fault, early reduced these interests to logical sequence. He said, "For the infantry, men must first be fed, next armed, and even clothing must follow these; for if they are fed and have arms and ammunition they can fight." Thus the Subsistence Department had in a general way, a preference for its requisitions on the Treasury; my department came next, and the Quarter-master's followed. Of course the Medical Department had in some things the lead of all, for its duties referred to the men themselves, and it was necessary first of all to keep the hospitals empty and the ranks full.

To economize leather, the cartridge-boxes and waist-belts were made of prepared cotton cloth, stitched in three or four thicknesses. Bridle-reins were also so made, and even cartridge-boxes covered with it, except the flap. Saddle skirts, too, were sometimes made in this way, heavily stitched. An ardent admirer of the South came over from Washington to offer his patent for making soldiers' shoes with no leather except the soles. The shoes were approved by all except those who wore them. The soldiers exchanged them with the first prostrate enemy who no longer needed his leathern articles. To get leather, each Department bargained for its own hides—made contracts with the tanner—procured hands for him by exemption from the army—got transportation over the railroads for the hides and for supplies—and finally, assisted the tanner to procure food for his hands, and other supplies for his tannery. One can readily see from this instance how the labors of the heads of the departments became extended. Nothing but thorough organization could accomplish these multiplied and varied duties. We even established a fishery on the Cape Fear river to get oil for mechanical purposes, getting from the sturgeon *beef* at the same time for our workmen.

In cavalry equipments, the main thing was to get a good saddle—one that did not ruin the back of the horse; for that, and not the rider's seat is the point to be achieved. The rider soon accommo-

dates himself to the seat provided for him. Not so the animal's back, which suffers from a bad saddle. We adopted Jenifer's tree, which did very well while the horses were in good condition, and was praised by that prince of cavalrymen, General J. E. B. Stuart; but it came down on the horses backbone and withers as soon as the cushion of fat and muscle dwindled. The McClellan tree did better on the whole, and we finally succeeded in making a pretty good saddle of that kind—comfortable enough, but not as durable as the Federal article. In this branch of the service, one of the most difficult wants to supply was the horseshoe for cavalry and artillery. The want of iron and labor both were felt. Of course such a thing as a horseshoe machine, to turn out thousands an hour, was not to be dreamed of; besides, we would have had little store of iron wherewith to feed it. Nor could we set up such machinery without much prevision; for to concentrate all work on one machine required the transportation of the iron to one point, and the distribution of the shoes from it to all the armies. But the railroads were greatly over-tasked, and we were compelled to consider this point. Thus we were led to employ every wayside blacksmith shop accessible, especially those in and near the theatre of operations. These, again, had to be looked after, supplied with material, and exempted from service.

BUREAU OF FOREIGN SUPPLIES.

It soon became obvious that in the Ordnance Department we must rely greatly on the introduction of articles of prime necessity through the blockade ports. As before stated, President Davis early saw this, and had an officer detailed to go abroad as the agent of the department. To systematize the introduction of the purchases, it was soon found advisable to own and run our own steamers. Major Huse made the suggestion also from that side of the water. Accordingly, he purchased and sent in the Robert E. Lee at a cost of £30,000, a vessel capable of stowing six hundred and fifty bales of cotton. This vessel was kept running between Bermuda and Wilmington, and made some fifteen to eighteen successive trips before she was finally captured—the first twelve with the regularity of a packet. She was commanded first by Captain Wilkinson, of the navy. Soon the Cornubia, named the Lady Davis, was added, and ran as successfully as the R. E. Lee. She had the capacity of about four hundred and fifty bales, and was during the latter part of her career commanded also by a former navy officer, Captain R. H. Gayle. These vessels were long, low and rather narrow, built for swiftness, and with their lights

out and with fuel that made little smoke they contrived to slip in and out of Wilmington at pleasure, in spite of a cordon of Federal cruisers eager for the spoils of a blockade-runner. Other vessels—the *Eugenia*, a beautiful ship, the *Stag*, and several others were added, all devoted to carrying ordnance supplies, and finally general supplies. To supervise shipments at Bermuda, to which point they were brought by neutrals, either by steam or sail, Major Norman Walker was sent there by Mr. Secretary Randolph about midsummer, 1862. Later, an army officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Smith Stansbury, was detached to take charge of the stores accumulated there. Depots were likewise made at Nassau and Havana. Thus much of the foreign organization.

But the organization of the business outside of our own soil was much the simplest part of the service. The home administration involved a variety of work so foreign to my other duties that I soon looked about for the proper person to discharge them in the most effective manner by exclusive devotion to them; and I had Lieutenant-Colonel Bayne detailed to my office for this duty. He had been wounded at Shiloh, and on his recovery joined me about September, 1862.

It was soon found necessary, in order that the vessels coming in through the blockade might have their lading promptly on their arrival, that the Bureau should undertake the procuring and shipment of cotton to Wilmington, Charleston, and other points, for we had vessels arriving at half-a-dozen ports, from Wilmington to Galveston. This necessitated the establishment of a steam compress at Wilmington, and, affiliated with it, agents to procure the cotton in the interior and see it to its destination; for the railroads were now so overtasked that it was only by placing positive orders from the Secretary of War in the hands of a selected agent that the cotton could be certainly forwarded over the various roads. The steam press was kept fully at work, in charge of Captain James M. Seixas (Washington artillery). The necessity for transportation over the railroads brought us in contact with them, and gave them claim on us for assistance in the matter of supplies, such as steel, iron, copper, &c., and especially for work at the various foundries and machine-shops, in which precedence was of course claimed for army work, and which were therefore in great part controlled by the Ordnance Department. The foreign supplies were not all conveyed through steamers. Contracts were out for supplies through Texas from Mexico.

Finding that the other departments of the Government would naturally claim a share in this avenue for supplies, which had been opened

chiefly through my Bureau, it was detached at my own instance, but remained in charge of Colonel Bayne, with a good staff of officers and agents as a separate Bureau.

Thus the Ordnance Department consisted of a Bureau proper of Ordnance having its officers in the field and at the arsenals and depots; of the Nitre and Mining Bureau, and of the Bureau of Foreign Supplies.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARSENALS, ARMORIES AND OTHER PLACES
OF MANUFACTURE OF ORDNANCE STORES.

The arsenal at Richmond soon grew into very large dimensions, and produced all the ordnance stores that an army may require, except cannon and small arms in quantities sufficient to supply the forces in that part of the field. I have by accident preserved a copy of the last number of the Richmond *Enquirer*, published under Confederate rule. It is dated April 1st, 1865, and contains the following "Statement of the principal issues from the Richmond arsenal, from July 1st, 1861, to January 1st, 1865:"

341 Columbiads and seige guns (these were made at the Tredegar works, but issued from the arsenal); 1,306 field-pieces, made chiefly at Tredegar works or captured; 1,375 gun carriages; 875 caissons; 152 forges; 6,852 setts of artillery-harness; 921,441 rounds field, seige, and sea-coast ammunition; 1,456,190 friction primer; 1,110,966 fuzes; 17,423 port-fires; 3,985 rockets; 323,231 infantry arms (most of these were turned in from the army, from battle-fields and from the Richmond armory); 34,067 cavalry arms (same remark); 44,877 swords and sabres (from army, battle-field and contractors); 375,510 setts of infantry and cavalry accoutrements; 180,181 knapsacks; 328,977 canteens and straps; 72,413,854 small arm cartridges; 115,087 gun and carbine slings; 146,901,250 percussion caps; 69,418 cavalry-saddles; 85,139 cavalry-bridles; 75,611 cavalry-halters; 35,464 saddle-blankets; 59,624 pairs spurs; 42,285 horse-brushes; 56,903 curry-combs.

This "statement" appears as an editorial, but the items were furnished from the office of the arsenal, and may be relied on. Its Commandant at this time was Lieutenant-Colonel LeRoy Broun, of Virginia. In the items of cavalry-saddles, bridles, harness, infantry accoutrements, canteens and other articles of this character much assistance was received from contractors. A small part of the percussion caps also came from other arsenals. When we reflect that the arsenal grew to these great dimensions in a little over two years, it must be

confessed that good use was made of the time. The laboratory attached to the arsenal was well conducted and did much work. It covered the island known as Green Island, which was connected with the shore by a bridge, built by the Engineer Department, especially for the service of this laboratory.

Besides the cap machinery, which was a very large and improved plant, machinery for pressing balls, for driving time fuzes, for drawing friction primers and metallic cartridges, and other labor saving machines were invented, made and used with effect. In all respects the establishment, though extemporized, and lodged in a cluster of tobacco warehouses, was equal to the first-class arsenals of the United States in extent and facilities.

The arsenal of Augusta, Ga., was in great part organized in the city, where suitable buildings were obtained, and did much the same class of work done at Richmond, though on a smaller scale. It was very serviceable to the armies serving in the South and West, and turned out a good deal of field artillery complete, the castings being excellent. Colonel George W. Rains, in charge of arsenal and powder works, found that the fusion of a small per cent. of iron with the copper and tin improved the strength of the bronze castings very much.

The powder mills at Augusta, Ga., which I have already mentioned as the direct result of the order of President Davis, were wonderfully successful and never met with serious accident—a safe indication of the goodness of its arrangements. It showed, too, that under able direction the resources of Southern workshops and the skill of its artisans had already become equal to the execution of great enterprises involving high mechanical skill.

The arsenal and workshops at Charleston were also enlarged, steam introduced, and good work done in various departments.

The arsenal at Mount Vernon, now furnished with steam power and having a good deal of machinery, was considered out of position after the fall of New Orleans, and was moved to Selma, Ala., where it grew into a large, well-ordered arsenal of the best class, under the charge of Lieutenant-Colonel White. It was relied on to a great extent for the equipment of the troops and fortifications in the southern part of the Confederacy.

Attracted by the deposits of fine ore immediately north of Selma, made accessible by the Selma, Rome and Dalton Railroad, the War Department accepted the proposition of Mr. Colin McRae to undertake the erection at Selma of a large foundry for the casting of cannon of the heaviest calibre. A large contract was made with him and

advances of money made from time to time as the work progressed. After a time Mr. McRae was called on by President Davis to go abroad in connection with Confederate finances. He made it a condition that he should be relieved of his works and contract at Selma without pecuniary loss to himself. The works were thereupon assumed by the War and Navy Departments jointly, and placed at first under the charge of Colonel Rains as general superintendent, while an officer of less rank took immediate charge. Subsequently it was agreed by the War Department that the Navy should take sole charge and use the works for its own purposes. It was here that Commander Brooke made many of his formidable banded and rifled guns.

The foundry and rolling-mills then grew into large proportions, supplied by the iron and coal of that region. Had the Confederacy survived, Selma bid fair to become the Pittsburgh of the South. The iron obtained from the brown haematite at the furnaces in Bibb county (Brierfield), and from the Shelby Works, was admirable, the former being of unusual strength.

Mount Vernon Arsenal was still continued, after being in a great measure dismantled, and was utilized to get lumber and timber for use elsewhere, and to gather and prepare moss for making saddle-blankets.

At Montgomery shops were kept up for the repair of small arms, and for the manufacture of articles of leather, of which some supplies were obtained in that region.

There were many other small establishments and depots, some of them connected immediately with the army, as at Dublin, Southwest Va.; Knoxville, Tenn.; and Jackson, Miss. Some shops at Lynchburg, Va., were moved to Danville, near the south line of Virginia, and it grew into a place of some value for repairs, &c.

The Ordnance shops at Nashville had been hurriedly transferred to Atlanta, Ga., on the fall of Fort Donelson; and when Atlanta was seriously threatened by the operations of Sherman the Arsenal there, which had become very important, was moved to Columbus, Ga., where there was the nucleus of an Ordnance establishment. Colonel M. H. Wright soon made this nearly as valuable as his arsenal at Atlanta had been.

ARMORIES AND SMALL ARMS.

Besides the Arsenals, a brief account of which has just been given, we had the armories at Richmond and Fayetteville, N. C.; and arms were also made at other points.

The State of Virginia claimed all the machinery captured at Harper's Ferry, and was bringing it all to Richmond. It was agreed, however, with the State of North Carolina, that that part of the machinery which was specially adapted to make the Mississippi rifle (calibre 54) should go to Fayetteville, where there was an arsenal with good steam-power, the machinery to be returned at the close of the war to the State of Virginia. Colonel Burton, an admirably-educated machinist, superintended the re-erection of the works at Richmond. He was subsequently made Superintendent of Armories, and given full charge of the entire subject of manufacture of arms in the Confederacy. The machinery of the rifle-musket (calibre 58), retained at Richmond, got to work as early as September, 1861. If we had possessed the necessary number of workmen this "plant" could have been so filled in as to have easily produced 5000 stands per month, working night and day. As it was, I don't think it ever turned out more than 1,500 in any one month. Fayetteville did not get to work until the spring of 1862, and did not average 400 per month, for want of hands.

To supplement this scarcity of operatives, Colonel Huse was authorized to engage for us a number of skilled workmen, used to work on small arms, and to pay their passage over. They came in through the blockade at Wilmington without difficulty, but we could do nothing with them. They had been engaged to be paid in gold, which meantime had risen to such a price as to make their pay enormous, and would have produced utter disintegration among our own operatives. I offered to pay one-half of the wages promised them in gold, to their families in England, if they would take the remainder in Confederate money, which would support them here. I brought the British Consul to confer with them. But they stood upon their bond; and, foreseeing that their presence would do more harm than good, I simply, with their consent, reshipped them by the next steamer, and paid their passage back. The experiment cost us something like £2,000 in gold, and made us shy of foreign workmen, especially English. I think the Treasury Department did succeed in getting engravers and printers for their purposes at Columbia, S. C., to some extent, by importation; but my impression is they were not English. Of all obstinate animals I have ever come in contact with, these English workmen were the most unreasonable.

The Cook Brothers had, as heretofore stated, undertaken the making of rifle-muskets in New Orleans at the very commencement of the war. On the fall of New Orleans their machinery was hurriedly taken off by boats up the Mississippi. They finally selected Athens,

Georgia, as their point of manufacture, and under a contract with me, and assisted with funds under that contract, proceeded to reorganize and extend their "plant." They were reasonably successful.

The want of cavalry arms caused me to make a contract with parties in Richmond to make the Sharp's carbine—at that time the best cavalry arm we had. A set of machinery capable of turning out one hundred arms a day was driven to completion in less than a year, nearly all the machinery being built up "from the stumps." The arms were never perfect, chiefly for want of nice workmanship about the "cut-off." It was not gas-tight. We soon bought out the establishment, and converted it into a manufactory of rifle-carbines, calibre 58, as the best arm our skill would enable us to supply to the cavalry.

Recognizing the necessity of some great central establishment for the production of small arms, plans of buildings and estimates of machinery were made for such an one, to be built at Macon, Georgia—a point of easy access and near to a fertile corn region, out of the way of the enemy. Colonel Burton went to England and easily negotiated for the machinery, which was to have been of sufficient capacity to turn out about 10,000 arms per month. Buildings were immediately obtained for some machinery for pistols, which was transferred there; and Colonel Burton had made good progress in erecting ample buildings for the new machinery, part of which had arrived at Bermuda and Nassau when the Confederacy fell. But about six months before the close of the war, finding that the blockade had become so stringent that the introduction of machinery would be very difficult, and reflecting, too, that as long as the war continued this extended machinery would be of but little use to us for want of workmen, I got the authority of the Secretary of War to set it up at some point abroad and bring in the arms, which would be less difficult than to bring in the machinery and train the workmen. Colonel Burton was abroad on this duty when the war closed. Had the war been prolonged, we should in twelve months have been making our own arms in a foreign land, under the sanction of a private name. After the war it was proposed to transfer the entire "plant" to the buildings which were in course of construction for it at Macon. Peace would have then found us in possession of a great armory, which I much desired.

One of the earliest difficulties forced upon us in the manufacture of arms was to find an iron fit for the barrels. The "skelps" found at Harper's Ferry served for awhile, and when these were exhausted Colonel Burton selected an iron produced at a forge in Patrick

county, Va., and by placing a skilled workman over the rolling process at the Tredegar Works he soon produced "skelps" with which he was satisfied. We found that almost any of the good brown hematite ores produced an iron of ample strength for the purpose, and the even grain and toughness could be attained by careful re-rolling.

Besides the larger armories at Richmond and Fayetteville, smaller establishments grew up at Asheville, N. C., and at Tallassee, Ala. The former was the development of a private enterprise undertaken to repair and fit up old arms, by a citizen (Mr. Pullem) resident there, and afterwards as a matter of necessity assumed by the Confederate Government. Most of the machinery was moved before the close of the war to Columbia, S. C., whither, as a place of safety, other arms-manufacturing machinery was moved from other points. Tallassee was selected as a good manufacturing point, a large building having been offered to us by the proprietors of the cotton mills there, and some machinery for making pistols moved thither from Columbus, Georgia.

A great part of the work of our armories consisted in repairing arms brought in from the battle-field or sent in from the armies in too damaged a condition to be effectually repaired at the arsenals. In this way only could we utilize all the gleanings of the battle-fields. My recollection is that we saved nearly ten thousand stands of arms from the field of Bull Run, and that the battle-fields about Richmond in 1862 gave us about twenty-five thousand excellent arms through the labors of the armory at Richmond.

The original stock of arms it will be remembered, consisted almost wholly of smooth-bore muskets, altered from flint to percussion, using ounce-balls (cal. 69). There were some 15,000 to 20,000 Mississippi rifles; and then some irregular arms, like Hall's rifles and carbines—some short carbines smooth-bore; and there were even some of the old flint lock muskets. All this original stock disappeared almost wholly from our armies in the first two years of the war, and were replaced by a better class of arms, rifled and percussioned. It is pretty safe to assume that we had altogether, east and west of the Mississippi, 300,000 infantry, pretty well-armed, by the middle of 1863. We must therefore have procured at least that number for our troops. But we must also have supplied the inevitable waste of two years of active warfare. Placing the good arms thus lost at the moderate estimate of 100,000, we must have received from various sources 400,000 stands of infantry arms in the two years of fighting, ending July 1st, 1863. I can only estimate from memory the several sources from which this supply was derived, as follows:

Good rifled arms on hand at the beginning of the war (this includes the arms in the hands of volunteer companies),	25,000
New arms manufactured in the Confederacy and in private establishments.....	40,000
Arms received from the battle-fields and put in good order (this includes the great number of arms picked up by the soldiers).....	150,000
Imported from January 1st, 1862, to July 1st, 1863.....	185,000
Total.....	400,000

This estimate does not include pistols and sabres, of which a small supply was imported.

To account for the very large number obtained from the enemy (rather an under than an over estimate), it must be remembered that in some fights, where our troops were not finally successful, they were so at first; and swept over the camps and positions of the enemy. Whenever a Confederate soldier saw a weapon better than his own, he took it and left his inferior arm; and although he may have been finally driven back, he kept his improved musket. So, too, on every field there were partial successes which in the early part of the war resulted in improved weapons; and although on another part of the field there may have been a reverse; the enemy had not the same advantage; the Confederate arms being generally inferior to those of their adversaries. The difference of arms was not so marked at a later day except in cavalry arms, in which we were always at a disadvantage, the celebrated Spencer carbine being generally in the hands of the enemy's cavalry during the last two years of the war.

A CENTRAL LABORATORY.

The unavoidable variation in the ammunition made at the different arsenals pointed out, early in the war, that there should be a general superintendent of all the laboratories, invested with authority to inspect and supervise their manipulations and materials. To this end Lieutenant-Colonel Mallet, a chemist and scientist of distinction, who had for some years been professor in the University of Alabama, was selected and placed in charge of this delicate and important duty. I attribute much of the improvement in our ammunition to this happy selection. A more earnest and capable officer I cannot imagine. What a set of men we would have had after the war out of which to form an Ordnance Department, had we been successful! Rains, St. John, Mallet, Burton, Wright, White, Baldwin, Rhett, Ellicott, An-

draws, Childs, DeLagnel, Hutter, and others, who would have remained in the service. Then there were some no less admirable, like LeRoy Broun, Allan, Wiley Browne, Morton, Colston, Bayne, Cuyler, E. B. Smith, &c., who would doubtless have returned to their civil avocations.

Among the obvious necessities of a well-regulated service, was one large, central laboratory, where all ammunition should be made—thus securing absolute uniformity where uniformity was vital. The policy of dissemination so necessary to husband our transportation, and to utilize the labor of non-combatants, must here yield to the greater necessity of obtaining our ammunition uniform in quality and in dimensions. Authority was, therefore, obtained from the War Department to concentrate this species of work at some central laboratory. Macon, Ga., was selected, and Colonel Mallet placed in charge of the Central Laboratory, as Burton was later placed in charge of a National Armory. Plans of the buildings and of the machinery required were submitted to the Secretary of War, approved, and the work begun with energy. This pile of buildings had a façade of 600 feet, was designed with taste, and comprehended every possible appliance for good and well-organized work. The buildings were nearly ready for occupation at the close of the war, and some of the machinery had arrived at Bermuda. In point of time, this project preceded that of the National Armory, and was much nearer completion. These, with our admirable powder-mills at Augusta, would have completed a set of works for the Ordnance Department; and in them we would have been in condition to supply arms and munitions to 300,000 men. To these would have been added a foundry for heavy guns at Selma or Brierfield, Ala.; at which latter place the strongest cast-iron in the country was produced, and where we had already purchased and were carrying on a furnace for the production of cold-blast charcoal pig for this special purpose. All these establishments were in the heart of the country, not readily reached by the enemy; and were, in fact, never reached by them until just at the close of the war. Being in or near an excellent agricultural region, they would have had the advantage of cheap living for operatives; and they had all sufficient facilities for transportation, being situated on main lines of railroad.

SUMMARY.

I have thus, from memory, faintly traced the development of the means and resources by which our large armies were supplied with arms and ammunition. This involved manufacturing, mining and

importation. The last two were confided in time to sub-bureaus created *ex-necessitate*, which were subsequently detached. The first was carried on by the armories, arsenals, laboratories and depots above mentioned. We began in April, 1861, without an arsenal, laboratory or powder mill of any capacity, and with no foundry or rolling mill, except at Richmond, and before the close of 1863, in little over two years, we had built up, during all the harrassments of war, holding our own in the field defiantly and successfully against a powerful and determined enemy. Crippled as we were by a depreciated currency; throttled with a blockade that deprived us of nearly all means of getting material or workmen; obliged to send almost every able-bodied man to the field; unable to use the slave labor with which we were abundantly supplied, except in the most unskilled departments of production; hampered by want of transportation even of the commonest supplies of food; with no stock on hand even of the articles, such as steel, copper, lead, iron, leather, which we must have to build up our establishments; and in spite of these deficiencies we persevered at home as determinedly as did our troops in the field against a more tangible opposition, and in a little over two years created, almost literally out of the ground, foundries and rolling mills (at Selma, Richmond, Atlanta, and Macon), smelting works (at Petersburg), chemical works (at Charlotte, N. C.), a powder mill far superior to any in the United States and unsurpassed by any across the ocean, and a chain of arsenals, armories and laboratories equal in their capacity and their improved appointments to the best of those in the United States, stretching link by link from Virginia to Alabama. Our people are justly proud of the valor and constancy of the troops which bore their banners bravely in the front of the enemy; but they will also reflect that these creations of skill and labor were the monuments which represented the patience, industry and perseverance of the devoted and patriotic citizens; for of the success which attended the operations of any department of the Confederate Government the larger moiety was due to the co-operation of the body of the people—a co-operation founded in their hearty sympathy with and their entire faith in the cause which that government represented.

ORGANIZATION.

The Ordnance Bureau, as finally organized, consisted of one Brigadier-General, one Colonel, and of such additional number of field-officers, Captains, and First Lieutenants as the service required. They were artillery officers on ordnance duty.

Appointments to these positions were at first made by selection, on nomination by the Ordnance Bureau; but about October, 1862, Congress created fifty officers of artillery especially for ordnance duty, to which two hundred more were subsequently added. As selection for these offices involved much political contrivance, I obtained the order of the Secretary of War to hold examinations for appointment to the grade of Captain and First Lieutenant. This plan succeeded entirely, and relieved us from a thousand personal solicitations. The first examination was held at Richmond. Of some five hundred applications found on file for ordnance officers, less than one hundred came to the examination, and of these only some forty or fifty passed. The examination for Captain involved a fair knowledge of a college course of mathematics, and none, I believe, passed this except the M. A.'s of the University of Virginia. That for First Lieutenant embraced only an ordinary English education, with a full examination on the Ordnance Manual. This gave us an excellent set of officers—educated men; and although a few of them were, as was said, "Virginia school-masters," and cannot be said to have distinguished themselves professionally, yet they were all respectable on account of their education; and I am sure there never were in any army a better class of such officers.

These examinations were extended, and were held at the headquarters of each army in the field by a commission, of which Lieutenant-Colonel Le Roy Broun and Lieutenant-Colonel S. Stansbury, Colonel T. A. Rhett and Major J. Wilcox Browne were the chief members. These, or one of them, went to an army and associated with themselves one or more officers detailed by the General at headquarters. In order to provide for that class of valuable officers distinguished for excellent qualities developed by service on the field, but not prepared for a somewhat technical examination, each General of an army designated one or two of this class, who were appointed on his recommendation alone.

Officers in the field were distributed as follows: To each army a "chief ordnance officer," with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel; to each army corps, an ordnance officer with the rank of Major; to each division a Captain, and to each brigade a First Lieutenant: all these attached to the staff of their respective Generals, but reporting also, directly if necessary, to the ordnance officer, through his superior, in the field, and receiving instructions as to special duties through the same channel. Every regiment had an ordnance Sergeant, charged with the care of the ordnance wagon, which contained the spare arms and the ammunition of each regiment.

The officers in command of the greater ordnance establishments—such as Richmond and Augusta, &c.—had the grade of Lieutenant-Colonel, like the “chief ordnance officers” of armies in the field, while at the lesser establishments the officers had rank according to the gravity of the duties devolving on them.

The Superintendent of Armories, Lieutenant-Colonel Burton, and the Superintendent of Laboratories, Lieutenant-Colonel Mallet, had also the grade of the higher officers on duty in the field.

The labors and responsibilities of my department closed practically at Charlotte, North Carolina, on the 26th of April, when the President left that place with an escort for the trans-Mississippi. My last stated official duty, that I can recall, was to examine a cadet in the Confederate service for promotion to commissioned officer. On the afternoon of the 25th of April I received due formal notice from the Adjutant-General's office that General Lawton, Quartermaster-General, General Gilmer, Chief Engineer, and I were constituted a Board of Examiners on Cadet —. We met a little before sundown, in the ample upper story of a warehouse in Charlotte, North Carolina, and by the waning light of the last day of the Confederate Government, we went through all the stages of an examination of an expectant Lieutenant of the Confederate armies. Lawton, I think, took him on geography and history, Gilmer on the mathematics, while I probably tested his English grammar. He passed the ordeal in triumph and got his commission, which I dare say he prizes very highly, as he ought to do, considering the august body that signed the certificate which pronounced him qualified for it. Altogether there is no little incident in my Confederate career that I have mused over oftener than that twilight examination of the last Confederate cadet.

DETACHED OBSERVATIONS.

Consumption of Small-Arm Cartridges.

It appears that the Richmond laboratory made 72,000,000 cartridges in three and a-half years, say one thousand working days. As this laboratory made nearly as much as all the others combined, we may safely place the entire production at 150,000,000, or 150,000 per day. As our reserves remained nearly the same, being but slightly increased toward the latter part of the war, there must have been only a little less than this consumption in the field, say half a cartridge per man per day for the average force of 300,000 men, to cover all the accidents and expenditures of service in the field. An average, then,

of half a cartridge per day per man would be a safe assumption for protracted warfare.

In examining the returns of ordnance officers after heavy actions, I found that the reduction of ammunition amounted to from about nineteen to twenty-six rounds per man. At Gettysburg the reports of a few days before the battle and a short time after showed a difference of twenty-five or twenty-six rounds on the average. This was the heaviest consumption to which my attention was called. When our troops first took the field commanders were very nervous because they had only fifty to seventy rounds per man instead of the two hundred rounds prescribed by the ordnance manual. Later we raised it to about eighty or ninety rounds. The results of battles show that with proper dispositions for transfer from one corps to another there need be no scarcity with sixty rounds on hand, or even fifty.

Our soldiers were, however, in the habit of supplying themselves with ammunition by throwing away their empty cartridge-boxes and taking any well-supplied one that they might espy with the proper cartridges. What splendid fellows they were, taking even better care of their powder and lead than of themselves or of their rations. They were in downright earnest.

Consumption and Supply of Lead.

Allowing for waste, 150,000,000 of cartridges would require 10,000,000 pounds of lead for these alone, to say nothing of other needs. Where did all this lead come from? I make the following rough calculation:

	<i>Pounds.</i>
From trans-Mississippi mines (early in the war).....	400,000
From the mines in Virginia (60,000 lbs. per month).....	2,160,000
On hand at arsenals, &c.	140,000
Imported (not over).....	2,000,000
Picked up through the country and on battle-fields.....	5,300,000
	<hr/>
	10,000,000

This leads to the surprising conclusion that we must have picked up throughout the country over 5,300,000 pounds of lead during the four years of the war. I remember that the window-weights and loose lead about houses yielded 200,000 pounds in Charleston alone; while the disused lead water-pipes in Mobile supplied, if I am not mistaken, as much more. So that these two items alone supplied one-thirteenth of this vast gleaning of the country.

TRANSFER OF ARMS TO THE SOUTH.

It was a charge often repeated against Governor Floyd that, as Secretary of War, he had with traitorous intent abused his office by sending arms to the South just before the secession of the States. The transactions which gave rise to this accusation were in the ordinary course of an economical administration of the War Department. After it had been determined to change the old flint-lock musket, which the United States possessed, to percussion, it was deemed cheaper to bring all the flint-lock arms in store at Southern arsenals to the Northern arsenals and armories for alteration, rather than to send the necessary machinery and workmen to the South. Consequently the Southern arsenals were stripped of their deposits, which were sent to Springfield, Watervelet, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Frankfort, Pa., and other points. After the conversion had been completed the denuded Southern arsenals were again supplied with about the same numbers, perhaps slightly augmented, that had formerly been stored there. The quota deposited at the Charleston arsenal, where I was stationed in 1860, arrived there full a year before the opening of the war.

THE NAPOLEON FIELD-GUN.

I think I will be sustained by the artillery in saying that on the whole, this gun became the favorite for field service: perhaps because our rifle-shells with percussion fuzes, were, as stated by General Alexander less successful than those of the enemy. When copper became scarce, we fabricated an iron Napoleon with a wrought iron jacket, weighing in all 1,250 pounds, which was entirely satisfactory; and was cheerfully accorded by the artillery companionship with their bronze favorites. The simplicity and certainty of the ammunition of this smooth-bore, its capacity for grape and canister, its good range, and its moderate draught, as it was not too heavy for four horses, were certainly strong reasons in its favor. At the distance at which the serious work of the artillery was done, it was an over-match for rifled artillery.

HEAVY GUNS.

It was of course a matter of keen regret to me that we could not rapidly produce guns of heavy calibre for points, the defence of which against men-of-war, was of vital importance. But the ten-inch Columbiad could only be cast at the Tredegar Works, and although this establishment was in able hands and responded nobly to the calls made

upon it, yet tasked as it was to produce artillery of all calibres; especially field-artillery, we could but slowly answer the appeals made with equal vehemence from Pensacola, Yorktown, Charleston and New Orleans.

About the close of 1863, Major Huse sent in two Blakely rifles of about thirteen-inch calibre, splendid looking, superbly mounted, and of fearful cost! £10,000 for the two in England, with fifty rounds each. Charleston claimed them on their arrival at Wilmington, and I was glad to strengthen General Beauregard's hands. Unfortunately one of them cracked in some trial firing, with comparatively weak charges. The full charge which was never reached, was fifty pounds of powder, and a solid rifle-shell, of say 450 pounds. These guns were built up of a wrought iron cylinder, closed at the breach with a brass-screw plug, some thirty-inch long and chambered to seven inches. This cylinder had three successive jackets, each shorter than its predecessor, so that from muzzle to breech the thickness of the gun increased by steps of about three and a-half inches. The object of the seven-inch chamber in the brass plug was to afford an air or gas space which would diminish the strain on the gun. Such was the theory. General Ripley, however, cut down the big cartridge bags of ten or eleven inch in diameter, so as to introduce the charge into the brass chamber. This not being over three inches thick, cracked, and the crack, I believe, extended into the cylinder. On a report of the facts direct from Charleston to Captain Blakeley, he attributed the bursting to the high elevation given, though the highest, I think had been only about 150; an impotent conclusion for a scientific artillerist to reach. The fact of the introduction of the charge into the air space may have been omitted in the narrative to him, and thus he may have been drawn into this helpless conclusion. I never saw the drawings of the gun until after the report of the accident. Captain Brooke, Chief of Ordnance of the Navy, with me then looked over the drawings and evolved the design of the air-chamber. After this the gun was fired, and with moderate elevations attained fair, but not remarkable ranges, as I was advised. The cracked gun was skillfully repaired at Charleston, and restored to a reliable condition.

Just before the war closed the Tredegar Works had cast its first twelve-inch gun, after the method of Rodman—cast on a hollow core with water kept flowing in and out of it to cool the castings from the inside. This method of cooling has been found to give a marked increase of strength, and greater hardness and consequent smoothness to the finished bore.

EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS.

THE DELAY IN THE ISSUE OF OUR JANUARY NUMBER was caused by the pressure of work on our worthy printers, and in consequence of this delay we combine the January and February numbers under one cover.

We are sure that our readers will not object to this, especially as we present them a number of more than ordinary variety, interest and value.

RENEWALS have been coming in with gratifying progress, but there are many of our friends from whom we have not yet heard. We send this number to many whose subscriptions have expired, in the confident expectation that they will *promptly send us \$3 for 1884*. But if we should be disappointed in this, and any, from whatever cause, decline to renew, we hope they will at least have the grace to *notify us of the fact, and return (or pay for) the numbers to which they are not entitled*.

SEVERAL MODEL LETTERS, selected at random from the large number we are daily receiving, will serve to show something of the appreciation of our friends for the work in which we are engaged.

A reverend friend, who did faithful and warmly appreciated work in one of the brigades of the Army of Northern Virginia, writes as follows on a postal card:

"ST. LOUIS, December 26, 1883.

"Have not the most remote idea of not renewing my subscription. Will remit early in January. Fraternally, — — —."

Another gallant soldier writes as follows:

"ATLANTA, GA., December 14th, 1883.

"Rev. J. William Jones, D. D.,

"Secretary Southern Historical Society, Richmond, Va.:

"Dear Sir,—Inclosed I hand you draft for ten dollars (\$10), to be placed to my credit for subscription to the SOUTHERN HISTORICAL PAPERS. I know I am in arrears, but do not know how much. One thing I do know, and that is I do not want to be denied the pleasure of reading the PAPERS every month. Whenever I am behind, jog me up.

"If the enclosed is worthy a place among the PAPERS it is at your service. Or if it will better grace the waste basket, I am agreeable.

"Very truly yours, — — —."

We need scarcely add that the article sent will find an early place in our PAPERS.

The following has the "true ring":

"ST. LOUIS, December 29th, 1883.

"Rev. J. Wm. Jones, Secretary:

"Dear Sir,—Your card of 17th inst. just received. I at once enclose and

send you \$3.00 currency, renewal subscription for PAPERS and membership.

"I wore the 'Gray' from May, 1861, to April, 1865, so am very naturally anxious to see the SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY a success.

"Yours truly, — — —."

The following from a distinguished soldier who "wore the Blue" will be appreciated, as his sentiments are cordially reciprocated:

"BOSTON, January 16th, 1884.

"*My Dear Secretary*,—Enclosed please find \$3.00 in payment subscription for 1884, SOUTHERN HISTORICAL PAPERS.

"Let me congratulate you and the Society on the success of your PAPERS.

"The only way to get a correct and full history of the great civil war is to receive the statements of brave men who fought the battles and to *hear from both sides*.

With kind regards, I am,

"Yours truly, — — —."

"*Rev. J. Wm. Jones, Secretary*."

And of like spirit is the following, from a gallant soldier of "the other side."

"TRENTON, N. J., January 11, 1884.

"*My Dear Sir*,—I have this moment discovered that I failed in December to send my subscription for the valuable PAPERS of your Historical Society and at once enclose my check.

"Very truly yours, — — —."

"*Rev. J. Wm. Jones, Secretary*."

WE might multiply these letters almost indefinitely; but these must suffice, and if any complain that we have gone into the "blowing business" we have only to call on our readers to bear us witness that we have not often indulged in that direction, and that the moral of it all is that *we want more renewals and new subscribers*.

A MOST HIGHLY APPRECIATED MEMENTO, in the shape of a cane-head made of wood taken from the house in which Stonewall Jackson was born, has been sent us (through Rev. Dr. A. E. Dickinson) by Mr. J. W. Odell, of Clarksburg, West Va. We return our hearty thanks.

JACK WHITE, ONE OF THE HEROES OF SABINE PASS, is not dead, as reported in the extract we published in the October number, but is living at Houston, Texas, "hale and hearty," as one of our subscribers there, kindly informs us.

By the way we have from a Federal officer who participated in the fight at Sabine Pass a very different version of it from the one we have published. We regret that this, as well as other very interesting articles, was crowded out of this number, but it shall duly appear, and then we hope to have an account from some *Confederate* participant.

OTHER Editorial Paragraphs and Literary Notices "*crowded out*."